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ABSTRACT
TREATING THE REVOLUTION: HEALTH CARE AND SOLIDARITY IN EL
SALVADOR AND NICARAGUA IN THE 1980S
MAY 2020
BRITTANY MCWILLIAMS, B.A., NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Kevin A. Young
Health care played an important role in the revolutions of El Salvador and
Nicaragua. Both the Sandinistas and the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front
(FMLN) prioritized popular health throughout the 1980s. Clinics and hospitals served as
sites of revolution that drew healthcare solidarity activists from the United States. These
health internationalists worked to build community-level networks that relied upon
trained medical volunteers. In both El Salvador and Nicaragua, women comprised a bulk
of the community health workers. These women chose to interact with revolution by
building on radical promises of universal healthcare access. Healthcare solidarity activists
trained community volunteers and encouraged women to pursue their own needs within
the revolutionary frameworks. Health internationalists actively undermined United
States’ policies toward Central America. In the 1980s, the United States implemented
economic policies and supported military violence that targeted healthcare infrastructure.
In training community health workers, treating civilians, sharing knowledge through
international exchange, and sending funds and medical supplies, health activists mitigated
some of the damage being done. This thesis posits that health care was an important site
of revolution for Central Americans and internationalists alike. By choosing to mend

iii

bodies, medical activists stood in direct opposition to the violence of the decade. They
also served as fundamental to the revolution because they helped carry out the will of the
people. The revolutions rested on the hope of improving the lives of every day
Nicaraguans and Salvadorans. As the violence of the 1980s forced the guerillas of El
Salvador and the leaders of Nicaragua to focus on war, the people continued to
implement revolutionary health goals at the community level. This thesis argues that
understanding how health internationalists, women, and community activists engaged
revolutionary ideas of medicine is vital to the study of 1980s Central America.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
“I understand health care as a window through which one can discover more concretely
the multiple layers, old and new, of a society in the revolutionary-controlled zones,
forming itself through numerous trials and errors.”1 –Francisco Metzi
Italian doctor Francisco Metzi first travelled to El Salvador in 1983. After
spending three years in the guerilla-controlled territories of the country, he documented
his experiences in an attempt “to describe the immense difficulties and the exhilarating
successes, the bitter disappointments and the real growth processes” of the Salvadoran
people.2 Metzi, like so many others who travelled Central America in the 1980s, stood in
solidarity with the people and against the United States, by offering his medical expertise.
U.S. nurse Susan Classen, too, spent time in El Salvador in the 1980s. Moved by the
physical and mental trauma of El Salvador’s poor, she helped treat patients and train
health workers at the community level. Others spent time in Nicaragua, where they
helped train and disseminate the new health programs of the Sandinista government, and
where many helped in the war zones of that country as well. Each person who dedicated
their life to aiding the Nicaraguan and Salvadoran people put themselves at risk; this was
especially so for those who spent time in war zones and dared to engage in medical
practice.

1

Francisco Metzi, The People’s Remedy: The Struggle for Health Care in El Salvador’s
War of Liberation, trans. Jean Carroll (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1988 Medical
Aid for El Salvador), 2-3.
2
Ibid., 1.

Despite the international laws regarding medical neutrality in war zones,3 the
practice of targeting healthcare workers and facilities seems ubiquitous in conflict. This
fact remains as true in today’s conflicts as it was in the Central American conflicts of the
late twentieth century.4 Despite the dangers, solidarity workers, alongside the incredible
volunteers of Central America, worked to provide healthcare services to the civilians
most deeply impacted. Both countries went through major civil conflict in the 1980s,
which manifested in violence against civilian populations, displacement within the region
and abroad, and the explicit targeting of healthcare workers and facilities. Much of this
violence was supported and funded by the United States, and the legacy of that violence
continues to impact Central America today.
This thesis argues that U.S. solidarity health workers addressed U.S. policy in
Central America by healing the very people the U.S. sought to destroy. As U.S.-backed
forces intentionally destroyed health systems, solidarity activists built them back up; as

3

Medical neutrality, enshrined in international laws through the Geneva Conventions,
requires the protection of healthcare workers and facilities, the unhindered access to care,
the humane treatment of all civilians, and non-discrimination in treatment of the injured,
regardless of affiliation. For more information, see the International Committee of the
Red Cross’s database on international humanitarian law, particularly rules 25-29, 35, 55,
and 92. See also the Physicians for Human Rights Introduction to Medical Neutrality,
https://phr.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Introduction-to-Medical-Neutrality-FactSheet-2013.pdf.
4
Soumitra S. Bhuyan, Ikenna Ebuenyi, & Jay Bhatt, “Persisting trend in the breach of
medical neutrality: a wake-up call to the international community,” BMJ Global Health 1
(2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmjgh-2016-000109. See this article’s conversation on
the attacks against healthcare workers and facilities in Afghanistan, Sudan, and Syria
spanning from 2012 to 2016. For more reading on recent breaches of medical neutrality
in the Middle East, see Zoë Mullan, “Medical neutrality: resetting the moral compass,”
The Lancet 4, no. 4 (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmjgh-2016-000109 and Adia
Benton & Sa’ed Atshan, “‘Even War has Rules’: On Medical Neutrality and Legitimate
Non-Violence,” Culture, Medicine, and Psychiatry, 40, no. 2 (2016),
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11013-016-9491-x.
2

U.S.-backed forces aimed weapons at civilians, activists treated their wounds; as U.S.backed forces restricted access to medicine and supplies, activists bought and shipped
medications to those in need. This work focuses on the activist side of the equation, with
careful consideration of where those solidarity workers fit into the revolutions in El
Salvador and Nicaragua. Health care was an important site of revolution, particularly for
women and the poorest communities of Central America. During the 1980s, healthcare
solidarity workers saw this reality and worked in tandem with Central American activists
to make the revolutions real for those to whom it mattered most.
Chapter one lays the foundation for this work by discussing background on the
conflicts in El Salvador and Nicaragua, considering the existing literature on healthcare
solidarity and how this thesis expands upon it, and discussing the goals and methodology
of this work. Chapter two dives into the healthcare systems and statistics leading up to
and then defining the 1980s. Understanding how each of the acting bodies approached
healthcare is integral to the arguments that follow. Chapter three engages many voices of
healthcare solidarity and seeks to understand how they understood and navigated their
role within a revolutionary system. Chapter four offers a gendered perspective of health
care in the revolution by arguing that women embraced leadership in developing
revolutionary health systems. Chapter four further investigates ways in which solidarity
bolstered women’s voices within communities. Chapter five offers a look at how the
popular healthcare systems of El Salvador and Nicaragua fared in the early 1990s and in
the face of neoliberal policies.

3

A. Background on El Salvador and Nicaragua
1. El Salvador
“I came to see that the violence in El Salvador didn’t begin with the war. The
revolution was like an abscess that burst from the pressure of social unrest.”5 –Susan
Classen
The conflict in El Salvador was rooted in the 1920s when Agustín Farabundo
Martí Rodríguez, along with a growing number of radical left supporters, helped lead a
peasant insurrection against an oligarchical ruling class.6 In January 1932, campesinos
rose up in response to “the transformation of a radicalized union movement that became
revolutionary under the pressure of frustration among peasants and rural workers with the
violent abrogation of democratic rights, combined with a rapid increase in rates of
exploitation and dispossession.”7 The massacre that came in retaliation for the uprising
resulted in decades of continued repression along with “commonsense notions about the
danger of reformism and foreign communist manipulation of peasants.”8 Martí and his
Marxist-Leninist beliefs became the basis for the Frente Farabundo Martí para la
Liberación Nacional (Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front, FMLN), the guerilla
group embroiled in violent conflict with the Armed Forces of El Salvador throughout the
1980s. The conflict ended with the signing of the Chapultepec Peace Accords in 1992.

5

Susan Classen, Vultures & Butterflies: Living the Contradictions, 136.
Jeffrey L. Gould and Aldo A. Lauria-Santiago, To Rise in Darkness: Revolution,
Repression, and Memory in El Salvador, 1920-1932 (Durham: Duke University Press,
2008), 88.
7
Ibid., xxiii.
8
Ibid., xix.
6

4

The roots of the violence were nothing new in Salvadoran society. In 1982, Americas
Watch Committee and the American Civil Liberties Union identified those causes as “the
highly concentrated system of land tenure, the denial of basic rights to a peasant majority
still prevented by law and practice from forming independent organizations, and a half
century of hardline military rule by an army that has traditionally represented the interests
of the landed oligarchy.”9
The Revolutionary Government Junta of El Salvador came to power via coup on
October 15, 1979. The violence that defined the civil war began in 1972, “in the face of
60 percent inflation and 30 percent unemployment,” when a “coalition of opposition
parties formed to run against the oligarchy’s official candidate,” Colonel Arturo Armando
Molina. 10 Despite the victory of the opposition candidate, José Napoleon Duarte, Molina
was declared the winner. “Molina’s government was known for its friendliness to the
interests of foreign investors, export companies, landowners, and anyone who supported
his repressive rule.”11 These policies exacerbated inequality, which the Salvadoran people
protested. The regime violently suppressed protests and silenced prominent figures that
spoke out against the military violence. For example, on February 15, 1977, some 200
peaceful protesters were killed in San Salvador; on March 24, 1980, the Archbishop of El
Salvador, Óscar Romero, who had turned against the regime, was assassinated while
conducting mass; on December 2, 1980, four American church women, three of whom

9

Report on Human Rights in El Salvador: Compiled by Americas Watch Committee and
the American Civil Liberties Union, January 26, 1982, xix.
10
Teresa A. Meade, A History of Modern Latin America: 1800 to the Present (U.K., and
Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2016), 292.
11
Ibid., 292.
5

were nuns, all of whom worked with the poor of El Salvador, were raped and murdered
by Salvadoran paramilitaries.12
The brutality displayed in the 1970s endured through the 1980s, a decade that saw
the regime targeting civilian populations living in war zones and guerilla-controlled
territories. By the signing of the peace accords, an estimated 75,000 Salvadorans, a
majority of whom were civilians, were dead, 13 and the US had poured over US$6 billion
(US$4 billion via the United States Agency for International Development, USAID) into
the Salvadoran government in attempt to defeat the communist threat.14 In The Massacre
at El Mozote: A Parable of the Cold War, Mark Danner documents the United States’
complicity with one of the most well-known and horrifying massacres carried out during
the war. The brutal assault and murder of the people sheltered in the village of El Mozote
in December 1981 was not only a crime against humanity, but it was also covered up by
the Reagan administration, which helped train the troops who carried out such horrific
acts.15 In fact, by 1987, under the Reagan administration, El Salvador had become “the
only country since South Vietnam in which U.S. aid surpassed the government’s national
budget. Counterinsurgency training, U.S. military advisers, bombing campaigns, lowintensity warfare, electoral manipulation, subversion of the labor movement – the entire

12

Ibid., 292-293.
Ibid., 295.
14
Adán Quan, “Through the looking glass: U.S. aid to El Salvador and the politics of
national identity,” American Ethnologist 32, no. 2 (2005): 280,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/3805283.
15
Mark Danner, The Massacre at El Mozote: A Parable of the Cold War (New York:
Vintage Books, 1993).
13
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U.S. foreign policy arsenal [had] been used in El Salvador, and the United States [had]
become a virtual parallel government in the country.”16
The low-intensity warfare conducted by the United States in Central America
during the 1980s was a reincarnation of “the most repressive aspects of the covert
operations and counterinsurgent doctrines of the 1950s and 1960s,”17 policies that
encouraged the Salvadoran Army’s strategy of ‘draining the sea’. This policy aimed to
eliminate the support base, and potential support base, of the FMLN by destroying the
people and the infrastructure of the war zones. It was, according to John Waghelstein, the
leader of the U.S. military’s advisory team in El Salvador, “total war at the grassroots
level.”18 This total war on the ground meant the intentional targeting of health care,
healthcare workers, facilities, and those found in possession of medical equipment. The
low-intensity warfare of the United States deeply impacted the people of Central America
in every way, but the destruction, and attempted destruction, of their health was one
particular way that Nicaraguan and Salvadoran citizens suffered most during the decade
of violence.
2. Nicaragua
In many ways Nicaragua was the inverse of El Salvador. While El Salvador’s
revolutionary movement was being violently suppressed, Nicaragua’s had succeeded;
while the Salvadoran government implemented mass violence against its civilians,
Nicaragua’s government sought to build a government for the masses; while the United

16

Metzi, The People’s Remedy, xi.
Quoted in Greg Grandin, Empire’s Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and
the Rise of the New Imperialism (New York: Holt Paperbacks, 2006), 118.
18
Ibid., 91.
17

7

States funneled millions of dollars toward the support of the Salvadoran government, the
United States funneled millions of dollars to destroy the Nicaraguan government. Despite
the differences, the civilian populations of each endured violence and hardship at the
hands of United States’ policies. The low-intensity warfare used against Salvadoran
peasants also defined the violence in Nicaragua.
Like the FMLN, the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (Sandinsta
National Liberation Front, FSLN) in Nicaragua was rooted in politics of the 1920s.
Augusto César Sandino led armed opposition to U.S. occupation from 1927 to 1933.19
Despite the relationship between Sandino and Martí, and though the U.S. labeled him a
communist, Sandino “was not motivated by communist ideology.”20 Though the U.S.
occupying force did withdraw from Nicaragua in 1933, it left a U.S.-trained National
Guard and a president friendly to U.S. interests. On February 21, 1934, Sandino was
executed, which set the stage for his name to be used again decades later in advocating
for change in the country.
After ordering Sandino’s execution, Anastasio Somoza García assumed the
presidency, a position he and then then his sons, would hold for several decades. The
Somoza era saw the repression of the Nicaraguan people and ultimately led to the
formation of the FSLN in 1961. For nearly two decades, the FSLN battled against the
Somoza regime in an attempt to install a democratic, revolutionary government. On July
19, 1979, the FSLN successfully brought down the regime of Anastasio “Tachito”

19

Matilde Zimmermann, Sandinista: Carlos Fonseca and the Nicaraguan Revolution
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), 5.
20
Meade, A History of Modern Latin America, 208.
8

Somoza DeBayle in a victory that reverberated in Central America and terrified the
United States.21
Nicaragua has long been a hotspot for U.S. intervention. In the mid-nineteenth
century, the U.S. was deeply interested in building a canal across Nicaragua. With few
exceptions, the United States government occupied Nicaragua for twenty-two years
between 1911 and 1933 in a move to give U.S. companies greater advantage in the fruit
and coffee industries.22 In the 1920s, Nicaragua became “the site of a struggle over U.S.
involvement in international affairs.”23 When the U.S.-friendly Somoza dictatorship fell
in 1979, the United States again intervened in the country by arming and training
opposition fighters against the Sandinistas. This group, the Contras, would devastate the
Nicaraguan countryside and severely limit the FSLN’s ability to enact real reform.
Not only was the violence of the U.S.-backed Contras detrimental to the FSLN,
but from 1981, the United States “blocked $163.5 million in multilateral loans to
Nicaragua, which were intended to fund road and housing construction projects as well as
new health facilities.”24 By ending bilateral assistance, blocking multilateral loans and
commercial credit, and enforcing a trade embargo against Nicaragua, the Reagan
administration forced the FSLN to turn toward the USSR for assistance, and effectively
curbed their support for the FMLN in El Salvador.25

21

Zimmermann, Sandinsta, 220.
Meade, A History of Modern Latin America, 208.
23
Lars Schoultz, Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin
America (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1998), 265.
24
Paula Braveman, “Nicaragua: A Health System Developing Under Conditions of
War”, International Journal of Health Services 17, no. 1 (1987): 175, doi:
10.2190/DB43-MWPL-2V12-WGXY.
25
William M. Leogrande, “Making the economy scream: US economic sanctions against
Sandinista Nicaragua,” Third World Quarterly 17, no. 2 (1996): 329-348.
22
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The U.S. actions against Nicaragua in the 1980s diverted money, time, and
attention away from developing the healthcare system the FSLN aimed to build.
Moreover, the resources that were funneled toward health were more frequently allocated
to victims of the Contra war. The low-intensity warfare that the United States waged
against Nicaragua, like that in El Salvador, had very real and devastating consequences
on the ground. The role of U.S. policy in Central America inspired solidarity in many
citizens. These citizens engaged in solidarity at home and, in many cases, by travelling to
Central America.
B. Scholarship
This thesis brings together existing scholarship on the conflicts in 1980s El
Salvador and Nicaragua, health care under the FSLN, FMLN and Salvadoran
government, and Central American solidarity. To date, a thorough consideration of the
intersection between solidarity, health care, and U.S. intervention in Central America has
not been undertaken. Though health often figures as a minor topic in the work on the
Central American solidarity movement, it warrants greater focus. Not only was health
care a major target in the violence that besieged Central America, but also many
Americans and others from around the world travelled specifically to offer their support
by providing medical care and community health planning. The actions of healthcare
solidarity workers, those based in the U.S. and those who went to Central America,
helped build on the popular health movements supported by revolutionaries. This thesis
brings together previous scholarship along with new analysis in order to further
illuminate the place of healthcare solidarity in building the revolutions of El Salvador and
Nicaragua.

10

Memoirs comprise a large portion of the written work on Central American
solidarity, and those written by healthcare workers and activists give important detailed
accounts of the realities healthcare solidarity workers faced. In 1984, Charles Clements,
published Witness to War: An American Doctor in El Salvador. In this memoir, Clements
weaves together his time as a pilot for the U.S. Air Force with his later endeavor to aid
the suffering population in El Salvador’s war zone. Clement’s memoir is both an
indictment of U.S. imperialism and a narrative tale of the realities of a foreign doctor on
the ground in El Salvador.26 Francisco Metzi’s The People’s Remedy: The Struggle for
Health Care in El Salvador’s War for Liberation (1988) looks at the experiences of
someone who learned the centrality of health care to revolution upon arrival. He came to
understand the revolutionary struggle through the building of successful health
programs.27 In Vultures and Butterflies: Living the Contradictions (1992), Susan Classen
expands on her time working as a nurse in El Salvador. She notes, in the first line, that
the “book was born of contradictions,”28 and in part, she refers to hope in the midst of
destruction, peace and love in the midst of malice and violence, and acts of healing in the
midst of so much death. These memoirs illuminate the contradictions and give insight to
the lived reality for solidarity workers in Central America. They are vital sources of
narrative that give life to the analysis presented here.
A portion of scholarly works focus on US-based solidarity efforts. In Sanctuary:
The New Underground Railroad (1986), Renny Golden and Michael McConnell write

26

Charles Clements, Witness to War: An American Doctor in El Salvador (New York:
Bantam Books, 1984).
27
Metzi, The People’s Remedy.
28
Susan Classen, Vultures and Butterflies: Living the Contradictions (Eugene, Oregon:
Wipf & Stock Pub, 2005), 9.
11

about the church’s role in keeping refugees safe on American soil.29 Roger Peace’s A
Call to Conscience: The Anti-Contra War Campaign (2012) looks at the battle to end
U.S. funding of the violence in Nicaragua.30 Emily K. Hobson considers solidarity of the
radical gay and lesbian left based in San Francisco in her 2016 book Lavender and Red:
Liberation and Solidarity in the Gay and Lesbian Left.31 The US-based response remains
significant to this work, though not central. Domestic actors often used health care as part
of their rhetoric against U.S. policies but less frequently made health care a central
concern. For these actors, healing wounds directly was hardly as possible as pressuring
Reagan’s administration.
Recent scholarship that emphasizes the agency of Latin American’s in fostering
and building solidarity serves as a significant base in this paper. Héctor Perla, Jr., argues
for a transnational approach to the Central American Peace and Solidarity Movement
(CAPSM). “Nicaraguan and Salvadoran revolutionaries, both in Central America and in
the United States, played crucial roles in this movement’s creation, growth, and
success.”32 Perla criticizes earlier scholarship for identifying U.S. activists as “sole
protagonists” of solidarity.33 This thesis follows Perla’s transnational lens by arguing that
U.S. healthcare solidarity workers played a crucial role in supporting popular health, but

29

Renny Golden, and Michael McConnell, Sanctuary: The New Underground Railroad
(Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1986).
30
Roger Peace, A Call to Conscience: The Anti-Contra War Campaign (Amherst: The
University of Massachusetts Press, 2012).
31
Emily K. Hobson, Lavender and RedLiberation and Solidarity in the Gay and Lesbian
Left (Oakland: University of California Press, 2016).
32
Héctor Perla, Jr., “Si Nicaragua Venció, El Salvador Vencerá: Central American
Agency in the Creation of the U.S.-Central American Peace and Solidarity Movement”,
Latin American Research Review 43, no. 2 (2008), 137, doi: 10.1353/lar.0.0011.
33
Ibid., 138.
12

that they were only successful in that role when putting the needs and desires of the
community first. Many healthcare activists sought a lower position in the hierarchy of
decision-making, though most recognized that they continued to receive privileges
associated with their race and nationality.
Comrades in Health: U.S. Internationalists, Abroad and at Home, the work of
Anne-Emanuelle Birn and Theodore M. Brown on healthcare internationalism acts as a
basis for understanding the significance of healthcare within the broader context of
solidarity. Solidarity encompasses a wide range of actions taken in support of people all
over the world. This work considers that subsection of healthcare internationalists,
whether they be trained health professionals, public health workers, or citizens
contributing their time or money to advocating for healthcare access. Birn and Brown
argue that “U.S. health activist efforts may be understood as a form of resistance.”34 It
may also be understood as revolutionary. The actions of health internationalists in El
Salvador and Nicaragua aligned with and built upon the revolutionary goals of the
people.
This thesis argues that supporting the popular health systems of Central America
served not only as a revolutionary act, but also as resistance to U.S. policies and the U.S.backed actions of the Contra and the Salvadoran government. Understanding the role of
healthcare solidarity activists is important because, according to Birn and Brown, “the
story of American health internationalists remains little known.”35 This thesis works to

34

Anne-Emmanuelle Birn and Theodore M. Brown, “Introduction,” in Comrades in
Health: U.S. Health Internationalists, Abroad and at Home, ed. Anne-Emmanuelle Birn
and Theodore M. Brown (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2013), 6.
35
Ibid., 6.
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rectify that obscurity by engaging the stories and experiences of health solidarity workers
in El Salvador and Nicaragua in the 1980s.
Scholarship on gender and revolution plays an important role in chapter four
where it is discussed more thoroughly. This thesis draws especially on the scholarship of
Diana Carolina Sierra Becerra36 and Sandy Smith-Nonini37. Sierra Becerra and SmithNonini each contend that Central American women defined revolution that was feminist
and broke with traditional gender roles. Smith-Nonini notes that healthcare, in particular,
served as a vital stage upon which women developed their own gendered ideas of
revolution.
Steve Striffler’s 2019 work, Solidarity: Latin America and the US Left in the Era
of Human Rights, offers an extensive and important consideration of American’s
solidarity with Latin America starting with the anti-imperialism of the nineteenth century.
Striffler explores “the broader history of Latin American solidarity in order to better
understand how current forms of solidarity came to be, and how past efforts have or have
not shaped or diverged from more recent struggles.”38 He focuses on the evolution of
solidarity rather than the mechanics. Striffler’s synthesis serves as a base for this work
not only for its timeline, but also because it contains important definitions and
considerations of what solidarity means. As Striffler notes that even his work is not

36

Diana Carolina Sierra Becerra, “For Our Total Emancipation: The Making of
Revolutionary Feminism in Insurgent El Salvador, 1977-1987,” in Making the
Revolution: Histories of the Latin American Left, ed. Kevin Young (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2019).
37
Sandy Smith-Nonini, Healing the Body Politic: El Salvador’s Popular Struggle for
Health Rights from Civil War to Neoliberal Peace (New Brunswick: Rutgers University
Press, 2010).
38
Steve Striffler, Solidarity, 4.
14

comprehensive, neither is the consideration given here. This thesis gives neither a full
picture of Central American solidarity, nor a complete analysis of healthcare solidarity in
the 1980s. Instead, by building upon previous scholarship and making connections with
the lived experiences of solidarity activists, this work ventures into a new aspect of
Central American solidarity.
C. Thesis & Methodology
Throughout the 1980s, Central America claimed much of the U.S. government’s
attention. The supposed threat of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua led to the U.S. backing of
Contra forces stationed on Nicaragua’s borders with Honduras and Costa Rica,39 and to
years of violence carried out by those forces. In El Salvador, the United States backed
violent regimes that favored U.S. policies and slaughtered the population in the name of
eliminating communism. The healthcare systems of these two nations experienced wholly
different fates in the 1980s. In Nicaragua, the FSLN pursued equitable, popular
healthcare as a central policy. In El Salvador, the U.S.-backed regime targeted and
destroyed significant portions of the healthcare system, while the FMLN struggled to
rebuild community health networks. This thesis considers how healthcare solidarity
activists responded to the violence and the attempts by Central Americans to build
popular health networks. U.S. activists played an important role both in supporting these
networks by travelling to Central America to provide medical care and in sending
monetary aid and medical supplies. In many cases, activists risked their lives to act as a
barrier between the people of Central America and the U.S.-backed armed forces.
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Understanding the many roles played by these solidarity workers is pivotal to the
conversation on how popular health systems developed in Central America. The policies
implemented by the Nicaraguan and Salvadoran governments will be considered here at
length. By considering the motives and actions of solidarity workers and health
volunteers in El Salvador and Nicaragua, this thesis will spotlight the complexities and
realities of accessing health care for the majority of Salvadoran and Nicaraguans
throughout the 1980s.
This thesis embraces current scholarship that uses transnational thinking as a
framework for research. It follows the lead of recent works which, as Heidi Tinsman
argues, “challenge the idea of a stark difference between the North American experience
(primarily stories about the United States) and that of Latin America (presumably all of
it).”40 Instead, this paper will consider the particular international connections forged by
a variety of actors including the U.S. government, U.S. solidarity activists, Central
American governments and Central American activists. In keeping with Tinsman’s
argument, the solidarity workers are not here considered to be separate from the world,
but rather in constant relation with the nations under consideration.
Exploring the role of gender in El Salvador’s and Nicaragua’s healthcare systems
is vital to understanding the consequences of the wars and the attempts to develop
community health systems in each country. The burden of family health fell primarily on
mothers in Nicaragua and El Salvador, particularly when so many men were engaged or
killed in warfare. During the violence and upheaval, women as caretakers contended with
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a lack of access to medicine and food for their families and for themselves. They were
asked to shoulder the burdens of provision and care in a time when both tasks were made
increasingly difficult. Further, women’s access to gynecological care and family planning
played an important role not only in the developing healthcare system of Nicaragua, but
also in the rhetoric of U.S. solidarity activists. Women assumed leadership of building
and maintaining community health networks that benefitted their families and brought
them together with other women. They stepped into roles that previously had not been
available to them, and they asserted their own medical needs in a way that pivotally
shaped access.41
At the heart of this thesis lays the claim that health care was revolutionary. For
women, health care offered a site upon which revolutionary feminism could be built. For
U.S. solidarity workers, constructing popular health networks through treatment, training,
and funding epitomized the struggle against oppressive forces and in favor of the people.
The people of El Salvador and Nicaragua saw in health care a way to engage with the
promises of revolution. Both the FMLN and FSLN espoused healthcare access as central
to their cause, but it was the people, the women, and the solidarity workers who actually
built the revolutionary goal from inside their own communities. Their efforts ensured that
the basis of the revolution remained central even as fighters and revolutionary leaders
focused their attention on warfare.
In carrying out this research, I engage a variety of sources. U.S. newspapers
provide an indication of what information was being widely circulated about the conflicts
in El Salvador and Nicaragua and the U.S. role in perpetuating them. Solidarity
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organization papers (including newspapers, flyers, informational pamphlets, and
membership request forms) show the incredible efforts undertaken to persuade the U.S.
public and policymakers that the violence in Central America needed to stop. They
provide vital information, prove the commitment of U.S.-based activists, and identify the
main focus held by each group. Central American government propaganda, particularly
that put out by the FSLN, identifies the goals and rhetoric used in promoting their cause.
Medical journals and reports published in Central America and the United States provide
important statistics and insights into the realities on the ground. Rarely do the reports or
journals refrain from a moral valuation of the numbers presented, so these sources also
offer insight into what medical institutions and professionals believed about the actions
taken by the United States, the governments of Nicaragua and El Salvador, and the
FMLN. Oral histories conducted by other scholars with Central American activists help
ensure that this paper considers the incredible work done by Central Americans, for
Central Americans. I am fortunate to have access to interviews done by the Global
Feminisms Project with activists involved in health care in Nicaragua during the 1980s.
Finally, I conducted a series of oral interviews with individuals who were active in
solidarity during the 1980s. These histories paint a picture of what life was like on the
ground in El Salvador and Nicaragua. They also identify the motivations of at least some
solidarity workers and show how so many U.S. citizens chose to act in direct opposition
to their government.
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CHAPTER 2
SALVADORAN AND NICARAGUAN HEALTHCARE SYSTEMS
“access to technically advanced medical care and political economy-inspired struggle

against oppression and exploitation are two parts of the same agenda.”42 – AnneEmanuelle Birn and Theodore M. Brown
Instability defined the politics of 1980s El Salvador and Nicaragua. Healthcare
systems, integrally linked to government policy and economic prosperity, underwent
changes and challenges that impacted the peoples of Central America in drastically
different ways. In Nicaragua, Sandinista policies attempted to provide universal health
care through popular health networks that functioned at community and national levels.
At the same time, Contra forces limited the capacity of the new health policies by
targeting medical personnel and health centers.43 El Salvador’s military carried out brutal
campaigns against rural populations, labeled healthcare workers as subversives, and
hampered the FMLN’s ability to setup health networks in guerilla controlled regions.44
El Salvador and Nicaragua traversed different paths in the 1980s, but each was
deeply impacted by nefarious U.S. policy that hampered the development of effective
healthcare systems. The Sandinistas were more successful in building health networks,
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whereas the FMLN had fewer resources and spent more time focused on fighting El
Salvador’s armed forces. Health statistics reflect this variation. This chapter navigates the
history of health care in each of these countries and offers a point of comparison for two
countries with revolutions that advocated for popular health systems in the face of U.S.backed violence.
A. Nicaragua: Sandinista Healthcare Reforms
“It will provide health care free of charge to the entire population. It will set up clinics
and hospitals throughout the country.”45 –Carlos Fonseca
Alongside defense of the revolution, economic reforms, and education reforms,
healthcare reforms formed a crucial cornerstone of FSLN policy.46 The Sandinistas took
major steps toward the development of universal access to healthcare by promoting a
system based at the community-level. In building these community networks, the
government was able to address a number of public health issues including high infant
mortality rates, widespread lack of access to vaccinations, and high instance of
communicable disease, all of which flourished under Somoza.47 The Sandinistas
considered health care such a vital aspect of their policy that “within three weeks [of
coming to power], they inaugurated the Unified National Health System.”48
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1. Somoza-Era Health Care
The rapid implementation of new health policies came in response to decades of
oppression compounded by years of destruction leading up to the success of the
revolution. Before the FSLN took power, years of fighting between the National Guard
and the Sandinista forces resulted in the loss of over 40,000 lives and 100,000 injuries
and caused major destruction of hospitals, sewage plants, and other public health
facilities.49 All this destruction was wrought on an already broken system. In the 1970s,
“Nicaragua possessed some of the Western Hemisphere’s most appalling health
statistics.”50 As such, a focus on health care was imperative for the Sandinistas in
building a better Nicaragua and in maintaining popular support. Moreover, the FSLN’s
policies around healthcare responded to the corruption of the Somoza regime. By 1975,
for example, thousands of poor Nicaraguans living in Managua made money selling their
blood to a Somoza-partnered lab that produced 15% of the world’s blood plasma.51 Under
Somoza, Nicaraguan’s health was something to be profited from; where profit could not
be made, health was disregarded.
The Sandinistas sought to rectify the class and geographic divides that defined
Somoza-era health care. Under Somoza, medical systems suffered everywhere, but the
people living in poor, rural areas of the country had little, if any, access to treatment. As
of 1974, three quarters of the health budget was spent in Managua, where only one
quarter of the population lived.52 Life expectancy during the 1970s was estimated as
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twenty years less for Nicaraguans than for their Cuban counterparts;53 maternal mortality
was twice as high in rural areas as in urban centers; urban areas had better, though not
great, access to potable water and sewage; vaccinations were rare with only 5.7% of the
vulnerable population under four years of age receiving the diphtheria, pertussis and
tetanus (DPT) vaccine in 1974.54 The actual statistics are likely worse considering many
of these estimates were made with incomplete data from rural areas.
John M. Donahue, writing in the mid-1980s, argued that Nicaragua’s Ministry of
Health failed to address these issues prior to 1979 because the health care “system was
characterized by vertical control, fragmentation with the twenty-three autonomous
institutions making up the health sector, and a mode of community organization which
enhanced the control and fragmentation.”55 Moreover, according to Donahue, this was
less a failure to reform than it was an intentional method used by the Somoza regime to
maintain control and political patronage over the population.56 He notes that the
“presence of many competing health institutions diffused internal solidarity within the
health sector and left each entity dependent on political patronage and control from
above… Somoza allocated health benefits less on the criteria of need and more on the
basis of strategic and political impact.”57 This system permeated the entirety of the health
care system. Hospitals utilized a system which denied care to those who lacked the
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appropriate admission fee, gave limited care to those with some money, and personalized
top-tier care to those who showed up with the most funds.58
When the FSLN took power in 1979, it intended to deconstruct the network of
political patronage and privilege put into place by the Somoza regime. The Sandinistas
put an end to health care as a privilege, and instead created an equitable system of health
care throughout the country. The reforms revolutionized the medical system of the
country, though they were not entirely successful.
2. Outcomes of Reform
The Sandinistas faced a monumental task in implementing popular health care in
a country where there was a limited prior network of facilities, professionals and
materials upon which to rely. The destruction of existing hospitals and schools in addition
to the flight of many trained medical professionals during the Revolution left the country
even more vulnerable than it had been prior to 1979. Richard Garfield, in discussing his
experience working in health care in Nicaragua, states that “the Sandinistas were haunted
by the fear of a mass exodus of doctors” based on the experiences of other Latin
American nations, like Cuba, where political upheaval had resulted in the flight of many
health care professionals.59 Some flight was inevitable as “many doctors were part of the
political and social elite of the country” and supported the Somoza regime.60 The
substantial impact of the reforms thus merits discussion. Despite setbacks during the
1980s, the FSLN made incredible strides in improving the Nicaraguan people’s access to
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health care. Moreover, that these steps were made in a developing country immediately
following years of poor economic and social leadership and a subsequent revolution
speaks volumes to the commitment of the Sandinistas, the Nicaraguan people, and their
allies to achieving universal health care.
Most accounts argue that the outcomes of Sandinista healthcare reform were
mixed, but impressive. This interpretation comes, in part, from doctors and other health
care workers who spent time working in solidarity in newly built clinics and who helped
develop health programs in Nicaragua. Dr. R. Giuseppi Slater wrote in 1989 of their
experience working in rural and urban areas of the country, and concluded that
“Nicaragua, in the nine years since the Sandinista revolution, has developed a medical
system that is physically and financially accessible, offers care that is very uneven in
quality, is generally adequate for most common problems, and is suboptimally [sic]
coordinated with preventive health efforts.”61 Slater’s main criticism of the system
developed in the 1980s was the failure to offer consistent, high quality care throughout
the country.
U.S. health worker, Sister Patricia Edmiston, discussed the difficulties faced by
the regime in building a healthcare network from nothing. In one interview she alluded to
a period of growing pains when she said that, “since the victory, all medicine has been
free. But that is being changed now because the richer people were taking advantage of
the [new] system.” She also noted that in the neighborhood where she worked, each
consultation cost ten cents, though the Ministerio de Salud de la República de Nicaragua
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(Nicaraguan Ministry of Health, MINSA) held no such standard.62 As the main goal for
the FSLN was access regardless of financial means, this issue was likely isolated to the
area where Sister Edmiston worked. Even so, it indicates the uneven distribution of care
and accessibility, particularly for the extremely poor.
The success of the reform lay in its popular roots. MINSA promoted grassroots
organizing and, starting in 1980, began organizing Jornadas Populares de Salud (Popular
Health Work Days, JPS, Appendix A), to “focus the attention of governmental bodies
and popular organizations on a common activity.”63 These events were intended to
encourage communication between local health councils and MINSA, though Donahue
argues that these health days highlighted “two competing philosophies of primary health
care delivery” within the Ministry, one that was based in popular health, and another
predicated on institutional primary care.64 The popular health model offered a flexible
path in which Nicaraguan’s in rural and poor communities had more consistent access to
health workers, though not necessarily professional medical workers or specialists.65
Statistics indicate a system that, though it faced challenges, had a broadly positive
impact on the Nicaraguan people (see Table 1). In just five years’ time, between 1978
and 1983, government expenditure on health care expanded from 200 million cordobas to
1,593 million cordobas.66 Massive campaigns around vaccinations saw the near
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elimination of polio and a rapid reduction in measles.67 Moreover, accessibility to
medical care increased significantly, with the number of visits to hospitals and health
clinics doubling in the decade after 1977.68 Visits to community-based primary care
facilities increased at greater rates than outpatient visits to hospitals, though this fact may
be contributed in part to the near tripling in number of community-based primary care
centers.69 This access was increased mostly in areas of greatest need. The number of
physicians and beds available increased in the first years after the revolution.70 Infant
mortality “decreased from 121 to 80.2 per 1,000 live births” between 1978 and 1983. In
the same time period, life expectancy rose from 52 to 59 years, while malaria decreased
by fifty percent. Diarrhea fell from the first to fourth cause of hospital mortality.71 A new
emphasis was placed on eliminating childhood dehydration through visits to oral
rehydration stations. The number of visits to such stations steadily increased throughout
the 1980s, particularly for children under the age of five.72
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Table 1: Nicaraguan Health Statistics from 1977 to 1984.
Year

Number of
Vaccine Doses
Provided1

Reported
Cases of
Measles1

Number of
Hospital
Beds1

No Data
3,784

Reported
Cases of
Whooping
Cough1
No Data
2,469

Dental
Visits1

4,313
4,677

Hospital,
Health Center,
and Health
Post Visits1
No Data
4,982,623

1977
1980

No Data
1,790,343

1981

2,544,396

224

1,935

4,729

5,411,432

331,821

1982

3,859,174

220

383

4,765

6,034,445

417,078

1983

3,304,155

102

90

No Data

6,467,187

448,417

1984

No Data

153

60

5,040

No Data

No Data

203,540
258,742

That the FSLN achieved so much success while faced with very little
infrastructure, a legacy of corrupt politics, and continued violence and destruction at the
hands of the Contras speaks volumes to the dedication and to the positive impacts of state
planning. Anderson argues that although the “Sandinistas did not accomplish what they
envisioned in 1979… what they did was impressive, in light of the challenges they
faced.”73 In just a decade, the Sandinistas tackled many of the pressing health issues
facing the nation’s poor. Despite the difficulties and setbacks, the FSLN proved that
social spending worked – a fact that they mobilized against their enemies. This was a
monumental task set before the Sandinista government, as were the many other reforms
they undertook, but they nonetheless managed to build a lasting infrastructure of
hospitals and health care staff as well as eliminate many preventable diseases that
plagued Nicaragua in the years leading up to 1979.
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3. Health Care and the Contras
The Contra war undermined the dramatic successes achieved by the Sandinistas in
the early 1980s.74 The U.S.-backed Contras attacked Nicaraguans to undermine the
Sandinista government. Violence, in all its forms, falls under the umbrella of public
health issues, and so it was every time the Contras attacked. Not only did they leave a
wake of death and injury where they went, but they also destroyed important public
health facilities. The destruction wrought against Nicaraguan infrastructure, including
healthcare buildings and professionals, was part of a targeted effort to undermine the
Sandinistas domestic policies.
FSLN officials diverted financial resources away from social spending and toward
military investment. Before the Contra war, investment “in health as a percentage of the
national budget increased by more than 50 percent between 1977 and 1981.”75 Between
1982 and 1984, the Nicaraguan military budget grew from 18% of total spending to 25%,
diverting money away from social spending, including the health budget.76 Moreover, the
budget that remained designated for healthcare services was funneled toward care of
wounded combatants including the creation of hospitals in war zones specifically for the
purpose of combatant care.77 Destruction by Contra forces resulted in an estimated $30
million in health system damages by 1987.78
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The diversion of resources resulted in regressions of the rapid gains made during
the Sandinista’s first years. In 1989, writing for the American Journal of Public Health,
Giussepi Slater stated that “the impact of the contra war, including the resultant economic
disruption… slowed or reversed some earlier gains.”79 Slater pointed to, for example, the
initial rapid increase in the number of physicians, nurses and nurse auxiliaries, which
leveled off later in the decade. In 1977, there were 52 physicians per 100,000 people; in
1983, that number had increased to 69. By 1987, though, the number had come back
down to 59 per 100,000.80 Similar trends occurred with nurses and nurse auxiliaries, a
fact that Slater argued was due to Contra terror efforts. Regression also occurred in
nation-wide vaccination campaigns. By 1986, regions designated as war zones saw three
times as many cases of measles, though all regions of the country reported similar
numbers prior to 1985.81
Healthcare professionals moved from civilian clinics to serve in hospitals created
specifically for combatants. Slater noted that, “the lack of clinical teachers and attending
physicians, already acute because of the exodus of well-trained doctors after the
revolution, [was] worsened by the contra war, which… caused diversion of resources and
manpower, including medical manpower.”82 U.S. doctor and solidarity activist, Paula
Braveman, referred to newly designated combatant facilities as “special hospitals” and
argued that the movement strained an already groaning system by mobilizing over five
thousand healthcare workers and their families and leaving limited staff behind “to cope
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with the increased patient loads.”83 The reorganization extended beyond health workers
and permeated the entire network of regional and centralized healthcare that defined
initial Sandinista policy. The reassignment of regional facilities as emergency and trauma
centers forced central hospitals in major cities including Managua to take on cases from
areas outside of their jurisdiction. Moreover, the repositioning burdened urban health care
and limited access for non-emergency patients.84
Contra forces specifically targeted healthcare workers and facilities in war zones.
In reporting on her 1985 and 1986 visits to Nicaragua as part of the Third and Fourth
North America-Nicaragua Colloquia on Health, Paula Braveman stated:
As of October 1, 1985, 38 salaried civilian health workers had been killed by the
Contras. Eleven additional health workers had been wounded and 28 others had
been kidnapped. Virtually all of these attacks occurred while the health workers
were assigned to medical functions. Health facilities have also been the direct
target of contra attacks. Sixty-one health institutions have been completely or
partially destroyed since 1981, while 37 others have been intermittently or totally
closed because of contra activity. Fifty-five of the 61 destroyed facilities have
been health posts, primarily in rural locations.85
Contras aimed to instill fear in the civilian population through this destruction and
violence leading to a virtually complete shutdown in parts of Nicaragua. One case study
of the villages surrounding Acoyapa (in central Nicaragua) showed half of the healthcare
workers had been kidnapped and five had resigned under threat of harm.86 Moreover, the
same study noted that 20% of health centers in war zones had been attacked, closed, or
destroyed between 1983 and 1987.87
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Simply getting to a health clinic became dangerous when Contra forces began
mining roads. Land mines threatened travelers and aimed to keep civilian populations
isolated and afraid. Healthcare workers risked their lives transporting supplies and
patients between villages, and civilians were often unable to make the treks necessary to
receive vital care. Marta, a woman from the isolated war zone area of La Pavona,
suffered from a severe strain of tuberculosis for which she required a monthly shot; the
trek from her village to the nearest clinic was made impossible by land mines.88 Many
health workers bravely faced the danger of the roads to deliver emergency care. U.S.
solidarity activist, Aynn Setright drove an ambulance for two years in conflict zones and
notes that the job was the most dangerous of all healthcare responsibilities.89
The war limited access to medicine and medical supplies, particularly in rural
areas where having such supplies often marked an individual as subversive. Importing
medicine from abroad, as Nicaragua had limited domestic pharmaceutical manufacturing,
proved difficult under the financial strain of the war and U.S. economic sanctions.90 The
mining of the port of Corinto, remembered mainly for the 400,000 gallons of fuel lost,91
also resulted in the destruction of “660 tons of imported foodstuffs and 40 tons of UNdonated medical supplies.”92
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The psychological impacts of the war strained the civilian populations and created
a need for more mental health workers in the country. In her 1985 and 1986 tours,
Braveman noted a substantial increase “in the use of outpatient psychiatric services,”
particularly for those who “lost family members in combat” and “mothers with sons and
daughters fighting in the war.”93 One study found that in 1987, 18% of mental health
consultations were related to the war and that soldiers constituted a large number of the
patients; the same study notes that civilians living within audible distance of gunfire
suffered higher levels of mental health complications.94
The Contra war devastated the lives of countless Nicaraguans, and it severely
strained a burgeoning healthcare system. Violence dampened the successes that had been
achieved in the early years and undermined progress in conflict zones. Facilities and
professionals outside of the war zones felt the burden of the conflict as the government
funneled resources toward the war effort and away from the popular structure
implemented just days after the Sandinistas took power. During the same period, north of
Nicaragua another battle raged on; the Salvadoran people and their healthcare system
suffered, too, under the pressures of war.
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B. Salvadoran Health Care: A Split System
“the FMLN… is establishing a health delivery system. The effort is heroic.”95 –
Medical Aid for El Salvador
Salvadoran health care suffered dramatically as the country’s civil war raged. The
(already poor) system deteriorated in the years leading up to the conflict, and the splitting
of the country into guerilla- and government-controlled areas only furthered the withering
of the system. Injuries and psychological trauma unique to war-torn areas increased the
need for access to health care while also ensuring that there was virtually no way to
acquire medicine, supplies, or professionals. Health care suffered in both regions and was
particularly difficult to maintain in war zones and guerilla-controlled territories. Despite
the massive influx of foreign aid given to the Salvadoran government, the statistics for
the government-controlled areas remained dismal throughout the civil war. Money
funneled into the country rarely found its way to social expenditures and instead funded
the brutal violence that characterized the El Salvador of the 1980s. El Salvador’s poorest
suffered the most from the unequal and difficult access to proper medical care in both the
guerilla and government controlled territories. Moreover, the healthcare system became a
pawn in the government’s strategy for winning the war. The government not only
targeted healthcare facilities and professionals in guerilla-controlled regions, but also
sought to destroy the very basis of popular health care promoted by the FMLN. This was,
after all, an attempt to suppress the Salvadoran people, and regardless of where those
people lived, they needed to be controlled. Nonetheless, the most desperate areas of the
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country were in the war zones, as evidenced in pamphlets, medical journals, and firsthand accounts that documented the violence and brutality enacted against those unlucky
enough to be living in the war zones.
1. Health Care Prior to the Civil War
Much like the situation in Nicaragua leading up to the 1980s, access to health care
became increasingly restricted for the vast majority of Salvadorans throughout the 1970s.
El Salvador had long been characterized by economic and social polarization, and the
“absence of a sound health programme” in addition to “the impossibility of access to
health services and medicine,” resulted in a “high level of mortality and a condemnation
of the people to a life of total misery.”96 Throughout the 1970s, health care was a
particular point of struggle for poor Salvadorans, and lack of access served as a central
rallying point for the urban poor, rural peasants and student movements.97 Interestingly,
though, health statistics had a general, upward trend that peaked in the late 1970s and fell
apart in the wake of the 1979 coups and the subsequent war.
The health trends of the decade leading up to war may have been slightly positive,
but any increases were minimal and insignificant in comparison to the massive financial
gulf that divided society. Nonetheless, the trends were toward a better health system.
Between 1960 and 1980, infant mortality fell from 76.3 per 1000 births to 44 per 1000;
child mortality rates similarly decreased from 17.5 per 1000 to 4.8 per 1000 in 1981, a
significant improvement; maternal mortality rates fell from 17.4 per 1000 in 1960 to 6.2
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per 1000 in 1980.98 There was a similarly positive trend in the number of hospitals and
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medical units operated by the Salvadoran Ministry of Health (see Figure 1).99
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Figure 1: Evolution of El Salvador’s Health Infrastructure.
Behind the statistics lay a reality in which health care was rarely available to most
Salvadorans. Throughout the 1970s, roughly 15% of the population had reliable access to
health care (access to private care and the Salvadoran Social Security Institute), leaving
the remaining 85% with a precarious relationship to medicine (dependent on an
unreliable and underfunded public health system).100 Moreover, immediately prior to the
outbreak of the war, the main illnesses reported by Salvadorans were linked to issues of
sanitation and malnutrition. Between 1969 and 1979, the number of children under five
years of age who suffered from malnourishment increased by 50%.101 The war, which
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saw an increased need for medical care alongside a shift of funds away from the Ministry
of Health and toward military spending, certainly helped to destroy an already crumbling
system. The system prior to the war was split, and the Ministry of Health had little
effective control over the allocation of resources and the growing need for medical
professionals throughout the country.102
2. Health Care During the Civil War
The decade of civil war saw a further deterioration of an already hobbled medical
system. The country was broken up into shifting territories, one of which was controlled
by the government, the other by the FMLN. Each of these territories saw a piecing
together of different medical systems under distinctly different interpretations of what
access to health care should look like. Moreover, the violence saw a greater need in care
for anyone caught, intentionally or not, in the fighting, and an increased difficulty in
accessing necessary medical supplies, particularly for Salvadorans in war-torn regions of
the country.
The health statistics from civil war-torn El Salvador are staggering. More than
50% of the population suffered malnutrition; the infant mortality rate in rural areas was as
high as 18%, with nearly half of all newborns weighing less than five and a half pounds;
life expectancy was under 45 years.103 One New England Journal of Health article
remarked that there was “virtually a complete breakdown in the health system. All
hospitals have shortages… In the Maternity Hospital two or three women occupy the
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same bed… In the rural areas virtually no medical services exist for the population.”104
The lack of doctors in the country, one for 25,000 people, meant most Salvadorans had
no access to healthcare at all.105
3. Government-Controlled Areas
Following the coups of 1979, repression of Salvadoran health care became
pronounced. In early 1980, Dr. Hector Silva, who performed routine cervical cancer
testing, was told that his recognition of positive cases was causing a social problem, and,
when he refused to cease the screenings, he was targeted and forced to flee.106 Dr. Silva’s
story was but the beginning of years of repression by the government that manipulated
the healthcare sector in order to undermine the Salvadoran people. The government saw
healthcare programs and efforts as subversive to their agenda as well as threatening to the
elites who had held onto power in the country for decades.
What government funds had been channeled toward health care were, once the
conflict began, largely subverted toward military efforts. Between 1976 and 1986, the
Salvadoran Ministry of Health saw a decrease from 10.6% to 7.1% in the share of the
government budget received (see Figure 2).107 The decrease in budget meant that that
hospitals and clinics struggled, more than they had previously, to provide even the most
basic care to patients. In hospitals surrounding San Salvador, doctors and nurses often
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lacked food for patients.108 One bulletin reported that the death rate of sick newborns
admitted to San Salvador’s Maternity Hospital approached an astounding 80%.109
Pharmacies had few medications to give, if any, and, for those medications that were
available, inflation of prices ensured they were out of reach for many Salvadorans.110
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Figure 2: Share of El Salvador’s Health Budget Allocation.
4. FMLN-Controlled Areas
The FMLN saw health care as a community issue, and one that should be entirely
removed from the market. Victor Amaya and Maria Black have summarized the FMLN
position by noting that the organization argued, “no matter what type of medicine one
practices, if health, knowledge, skills and resources are sold on the market as
commodities this will necessarily limit access to health care, fragment and distort the
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nature of the health process, constrain the relation between health workers and users, and
undermine people’s control over their health.”111
While the FMLN touted equal access to medicine for all Salvadorans, the reality
of care was far less rosy. Resources in war zones and guerilla-controlled areas were
scarce, and where resources and facilities did exist, they often did not exist for long.
Francisco Metzi described guerilla hospitals as similar to neighborhood cafés where
people gathered to discuss the latest news.112 According to Metzi, they were lively places,
but also places with very few resources. In describing the treatment of one FMLN
combatant, Juan, who had been shot in the leg, Metzi says:
It was a period in which we were very short on medical supplies. We didn’t even
have IV fluid. Under these conditions, an amputation is a delicate operation, and
even more so in the presence of a ferocious germ [like gangrene, which Juan had
developed]. But in spite of all this, we operated on Juan under a silk-cotton tree,
cutting through the bone with the tiny sawblade of a Swiss Army knife, and using
the milk from several coconuts as IV fluid.113
Metzi’s story highlights one extreme of the medical reality many faced during the war
years, but while scarcity was a constant, the degree of struggle varied greatly. In the latter
years of the war in the department of Morazán, FMLN medical care held to a clear
hierarchy with considerably more access to medicine and equipment than Metzi
experienced. In Michael Terry’s account of his time working as a brigadista in the
mountains of Morázan, he describes well-developed capacities for surgeries related to
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war wounds, and notes that there was access to anesthetic, IV fluids, and other equipment
necessary for surgeries; he boasts that all of the surgery patients he saw survived.114
Michael Terry’s account contains two particularly striking points. First, despite
the success the FMLN achieved in developing the medical system of Morázan, the health
clinics changed location daily so as to avoid detection and attack.115 This forced critical
cases to be relocated further into the mountains, but also meant that healthcare workers
were mobile and ready to perform surgery on the spot.116 They may have achieved
greater success in their medical structures, but the guerillas nonetheless were restricted in
establishing real change for the rural populations. The second striking point in Terry’s
account is his reference to the inversion in types of care that health professionals felt
most comfortable and able to treat. Over the decade, the guerillas had developed
advanced skills in dealing with gunshot wounds, injuries from shrapnel, and other warrelated injuries, but, as Terry notes, the “more serious problems at the clinic were dengue,
psychiatric disorders, fractures, and sexually transmitted infections.”117 In the war zones,
expertise followed necessity, and so treating and controlling illnesses that may have been
more readily treatable elsewhere, became the major struggle for war-zone clinics.
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The various accounts on medical care in the guerilla-controlled areas of El
Salvador indicate a blurred line between civilians and combatants. The FMLN
encouraged the development of a popular health system within communities. The clinics,
staffed by community health workers and, at times, international solidarity activists,
depended on the expertise of FMLN doctors and surgeons. While working in Las Vueltas
and the surrounding communities, Susan Classen and her Salvadoran colleagues relied on
FMLN support in handling severe injuries.118 Sandy Smith-Nonini notes the reciprocal
nature of the relationship, stating that just as FMLN “physicians treated sick or injured
civilians, promoters based in villages sometimes cared for wounded combatants. Several
sanitarios and civilian lay workers… assisted physicians in surgeries.”119 This was the
nature of the popular health system upon which combatants and civilians depended.
In the accounts of Maria Eugenia, Francisco Metzi, Charles Clements, Michael
Terry, Susan Classen, and others, the instability and chaos that defined the lives of
Salvadorans resulted in a rush to help whoever needed help, regardless of their
relationship to the war or their political persuasion. That civilians had no option but to
seek care from popular clinics supported by the FMLN made no difference to the
Salvadoran military officers who pegged the peasants as subversive. Certainly, for many
medical workers, a peasant’s political persuasion mattered little when they required aid.
Although the FMLN ideally saw an El Salvador with medical access for all, the
reality of the guerilla’s actions during the war often fell short of that, even in territories
they controlled. Peasants reported preferential treatment at clinics, not only for fighters,
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but also those related to guerillas.120 Charles Clements alludes to this in the account he
gives of his time working as a doctor in solidarity with the guerillas. Clements recalls a
series of conferences held to determine the division of medicine in the areas villages, and
tells of one medical combatant in particular who spoke at length in favor of unequal
distribution of resources to fighters because their heroism.121 This favoritism meant that
some peasants would have been unable to access medical care, as resources were slim.
One medical report published in 1989 in the New England Journal of Health
acknowledged medical neutrality was certainly violated at times by the FMLN, but that
the most frequent and most egregious violations were carried out by the Salvadoran
government.122 This reality is evidenced by how readily the Salvadoran government
wielded violence against medical professionals, supplies, buildings, and knowledge.
5. Targeting Health Care
The Salvadoran government deliberately breached international medical neutrality
in favor of undermining the enemy. 123 The tactic, hardly isolated to the Salvadoran
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conflict, brought even greater suffering to a population already being massacred and
displaced by the thousands. The deliberate attacks on healthcare workers and facilities as
well as medical knowledge, and the constant attempts to cut off medical supplies,
particularly to guerilla-controlled territories, took a toll, and contributed to the heightened
levels of brutality that came to define the civil war.
The Salvadoran military targeted healthcare workers and facilities in their
campaign to weed out guerilla forces. The government considered social organization of
any kind, including that around health, to be subversive.124 That the FMLN healthcare
workers often blurred between aiding guerillas and aiding peasants hardly helped this
issue. Many health workers, with their promotion of community organization, were
“imprisoned or killed by military or paramilitary death squads.”125 Simply having gauze
resulted in death or imprisonment as possession was reserved for the military.126 The
threats against health workers prompted many more to flee the country, draining
communities of their main resources for health care and medical expertise.
Of the health workers who remained and continued their work in El Salvador,
many disappeared during the civil war years. In 1983, Dr. Alfred Gellhorn wrote of a
medical mission he undertook to determine the location of twenty missing health workers
and scientists. Not only was the delegation unable to determine where thirteen of the
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missing were, they discovered a list of another twenty who had gone missing in San
Salvador in 1982. These numbers likely only represent a fraction of the reality as merely
reporting a missing family member could put entire families in danger of government
violence.127
The Salvadoran military wielded destruction of knowledge as a weapon against
the most vulnerable of the country’s population. They not only targeted health care
workers in war zones, but attacked the very fabric of the system. On June 27, 1980, the
Salvadoran Army attacked The University of El Salvador, the national university that
hosted the country’s only medical school. The army massacred forty students during the
takeover, and, in the proceeding four years of occupation, shut down the school and
ransacked its libraries and laboratories. In a September 10, 1984 news article, Chris
Hedges noted that although the army had allowed the school to be reopened, over half of
the books in the library had been stolen or destroyed. Moreover, El Salvador’s most
important medical school lost “all of the medical equipment and some 75 of the medical
books.”128 The cost of reopening and restocking the country’s premier university, and
medical school, was tremendous. The cost of losing four years of medical advancement
and investigation was priceless.
C. Healthcare Access for Central American Refugees
The violence that afflicted Nicaragua and El Salvador displaced thousands of
civilians. Some moved across borders to neighboring countries of Costa Rica and
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Honduras, others fled further abroad, including to the United States, and many faced
internal displacement. Both El Salvador and Nicaragua also took in refugees from other
Central American nations, with the Sandinista government embracing Salvadoran
refugees. Between 1981 and 1987, some 22,000 Nicaraguan refugees were estimated in
Costa Rica,129 while at the same time, an estimated 16,000 Salvadoran refugees moved to
Nicaragua.130 The displaced populations not only had a harder time accessing health care,
they also tended to need health care more frequently because of the danger inherently
involved in clandestine movement through the countryside and the poverty that defined a
displaced person’s existence. Moreover, refugees were often treated poorly, especially as
their growing numbers overwhelmed the capacities of receiving countries.
1. Displaced Populations of Nicaragua
The upheaval of the 1970s and 1980s forced thousands of Nicaraguans from their
homes. This process began with the Somoza regime. In early 1979, some 50,000 refugees
fled to Costa Rica to escape the oppression of the regime prior to its downfall.131 With the
beginning of the Contra war, many more Nicaraguans fled from their homes. As early as
1983, significant portions of the population had been impacted. Though the height of the
Contra war came later, the turmoil of the 1970s and the 1979 Sandinista victory, along
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with the early rumblings of Contra controversy, saw 22,000 Nicaraguans as refugees in
Costa Rica and Honduras and another 85,000 internally displaced.132
By 1990, the number of internally displaced Nicaraguans was estimated at
250,000, with many more having fled to other countries.133 Not all who left became
registered refugees in other countries. The bulk of Guatemala’s 220,000 undocumented
persons consisted of Nicaraguans and Salvadorans,134 and many more undocumented
Nicaraguans travelled elsewhere in Central America, and even further afield, to countries
like the United States. Many who fled the warfare became registered refugees. By 1989,
Costa Rica hosted an estimated 26,500 Nicaraguan refugees;135 El Salvador hosted 500
Nicaraguan refugees;136 Guatemala hosted 3,300 Nicaraguan refugees;137 and Honduras
hosted 23,600 Nicaraguan refugees, many of whom were Miskitu or Mayangna (Sumu)
Indians.138 By the end of 1989, the United States had 21,693 pending asylum cases from
Nicaraguans.139
Minority indigenous populations comprised significant portions of the displaced.
Though the FSLN committed to wiping out “the odious discrimination to which the
indigenous” were subjected,140 displacement of these populations came from both sides.
The Contra attacks drove them from their ancestral homes, but the FSLN forcibly
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displaced some 8,500 Miskito Indians in 1981, resulting in dozens dead.141 The Miskitus,
a tribe that has long inhabited the eastern coast of Nicaragua and the eastern HonduranNicaraguan border, faced displacement and internal controversy in the war years. As a
result of the forced relocations, many Nicaraguan Miskitus who fled to Honduras claimed
“that the Sandinistas were not liberators.”142 In the case of the Mayangna Indians, Contra
attacks forced the internal resettlement and the breaking of this ethnic group from their
homeland.143 Though not all of the displaced indigenous were anti-Sandinista, many lived
in Honduran-based camps that “the Contras tightly controlled.”144 Of those living in the
Contra-controlled camps, some realized they were trapped, unable to return home, while
others embraced the Contra cause and the anti-Sandinista propaganda by supporting the
Kus Indian Sut Asla Nicaragua Ra (United Indigenous Peoples of Eastern Nicaragua,
KISAN), a Contra-backed, indigenous organization that fought against the Sandinistas.
When a colleague introduced the creation of KISAN to Roxanne Dunbar-Otis, she saw
that the “whole setup smelled of CIA design,” and realized that the leaders of the
organization would be “taking orders from the CIA.”145 The Contras caused displacement
through violence and in an attempt to create upheaval, but they also seized the
opportunity to manipulate displaced peoples against the Sandinistas. The Contras
leveraged the minority-status and long-time neglect of indigenous groups to their
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advantage. They sought to erode Sandinista authority by turning the population against
them, and here was a population ready to be turned.
While the Contras sought the indigenous populations allegiance in an attempt to
further undermine FSLN authority, the Sandinistas looked to improve the health
conditions of those who faced relocation. The Sandinistas allocated resources to the
displaced populations that “in some cases resulted in levels of medical service far
surpassing those available prior to resettlement, mainly because of the inaccessible
location of the homelands of the majority of the displaced populations and neglect by the
Somoza government of rural zones.”146 Those who experienced displacement maintained
hostility toward the Sandinista government while benefitting significantly from social
programs around food and health care.147
Despite efforts to improve health systems for displaced populations, refugees
remained at risk for poor health and psychological trauma. In 1986, one Managua-based
task force found “that refugee families’ psychological problems stem not only from the
war trauma they have undergone, but also from the economic and emotional stresses of
being uprooted from their social and familial networks.”148 Moreover, refugees who fled
the country faced not only the associated psychological trauma but also the often poor
conditions of the refugee camps. In Honduras, many indigenous Nicaraguans faced a
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government that “tolerated refugees’ presence without offering them any viable means of
survival.”149 The overwhelming number of refugees moving across Central American
borders often left governments unable to provide sufficient care. In overwhelmed Costa
Rican transit camps, established to provide Nicaraguans the tools needed to assimilate,
“refugees suffered from general ill-health.”150
The displaced populations of Nicaragua no doubt faced psychological and
physical trauma. The degree to which they received care depended on their ethnicity and
the location to which they fled. Access to health care often times improved for those
displaced within Nicaragua. For those who left the country, the likelihood of receiving
regular medical treatment was low, particularly in Nicaragua’s overwhelmed Central
American neighbors.
2. Displaced Populations of El Salvador
Of the estimated one million Salvadorans displaced by the civil war, half were
internally displaced and half became refugees. Of the half million who became refugees,
an estimated 25,000 went to Honduran camps, 10,000 to Nicaragua and the rest ended up
in Mexico or the United States.151 The displaced populations, particularly those that
remained in El Salvador or ended up in refugee camps, faced high barriers to accessing
healthcare services. Moreover, displaced populations in El Salvador were often being
chased by government forces who sought to massacre them, and, if they were unable to,
cut off all supplies.
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Salvadoran peasants, particularly those who lived near or in guerilla-held
territories, lived in constant danger of being caught in the crossfire or accused of
collaboration with guerilla groups. When the government raided villages, Salvadorans
were forced to retreat in what were known as guindas.152 During these periods of
displacement, silence and discretion were of the utmost importance to the survival of
Salvadorans on the run. Those hiding from government forces were at times forced to
take extreme measures in silencing their children. In her book Beyond Displacement:
Campesinos, Refugees, and Collective Action in the Salvadoran Civil War, Molly Todd
notes that “the cries of hungry, scared, and otherwise uncomfortable children could
betray both the presence and the specific locations of the mobile communities [of
campesinos]. Because silence was so essential to survival, adults frequently had to cover
children’s mouths to stifle their cries with the unintended result of smothering some
children to death.”153 International aid helped to curb the number of these tragedies to
some degree. Campesinos began using various medications and sometimes liquor
provided to them by international medical personnel in order to keep the children
asleep.154 In a 1983 interview, Salvadoran nurse, Maria Eugenia, tells the story of how
she used medication to silence a screaming child in the middle of fleeing an attack. She
said:
We provide as much medical attention as possible, even during the retreat. One
time a compañera was running with a screaming baby in her arms. We knew that
the army would hear the crying and figure out where we were, so I prepared an
152
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injection to put the baby to sleep. Imagine yourself running and having to give an
injection – without wiping the skin clean or anything! Unfortunately, there was no
other way to avoid getting caught by the army.155
Still, access to medication could never be guaranteed to peasants hiding or running from
government forces.
Access to medical care rarely improved for Salvadorans if they reached refugee
camps. One group of foreign doctors who travelled to the Santa Tecla refugee camp, a
camp for internally displaced Salvadorans located near San Salvador, described its
residents as living in subhuman conditions with virtually all suffering from illnesses for
which there was little to no medical care.156 Moreover, many of the diseases from which
the refugee population at Santa Tecla suffered resulted from malnutrition and poor
sanitary conditions. According to one Congressional report, USAID reports had
specifically claimed to be providing humanitarian aid to the Santa Tecla camp mainly in
the form of nutritious foods. Upon further investigation, Congress reported that no such
aid could be confirmed to ever have arrived at the camp.157 A 1986 report conducted
together by the Instituto de Investigaciones and the Instituto de Derechos Humanos at the
Universidad Centroamericana, stated that 85.4% of refugees wished to remain in refugee
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camps despite poor conditions because of the safety of the camps.158 Refugee camps
situated across the border in Honduras presented similar issues of insecurity to those
located inside El Salvador. A 1982 supplemental report by the Americas Watch
Committee and The American Civil Liberties Union noted that the Honduran military
treated refugees and aid workers brutally, and that Salvadoran troops frequently crossed
the border to capture those suspected of working with the guerillas.159
Not all refugees experienced the same levels of service. Canadian solidarity
activist, Christine Reesor, spent time working in two different camps for internally
displaced Salvadorans, Betania camp located in La Libertad, and Calle Real located north
of San Salvador.160 Calle Real, she notes, benefitted from greater food security. She says
that at Calle Real, refugees “had three meals a day, whereas in the first one [Betania],
there were only two meals a day.” Moreover, at Calle Real, “there was actually a doctor
from the archdiocese who came out and provided medical care on site.” At Betania, “the
medical care was a little more tenuous. There was a nurse, but there wasn’t a defined
clinic site.” There were, she notes, doctors from the French organization Médecins du
Monde (Doctors of the World), who “visited the camp on a schedule to provide some
medical care.”161 Still, the camp at Calle Real had better medical care available for the
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refugees. But it came at a price. According to Reesor, the Red Cross and Archdiocese
agreed that wounded FMLN fighters would be treated at the clinic operating in the Calle
Real camp. While the displaced experienced greater access to care because of that
agreement, they also faced heightened danger. Reesor states that the presence of the
clinic “made the camp a target for the Armed Forces.” On January 9, 1988, the Armed
Forces surrounded the camp fired for an extended period.162 Discrepancies between the
two camps show just how different access to medical care was for the displaced, even
when they remained in the same country.
The displaced of Nicaragua and El Salvador faced an extra set of hurdles in
accessing health care. In both cases, the violence, as sponsored by the United States,
pushed civilians into precarious positions. Not only did refugees suffer greater physical
harm, they also dealt with the psychological trauma associated with being forced to flee
or relocate. Not all displacement was created equally. While some experienced more
consistent access to services, and others even had improved access, trauma and
uncertainty permeated the lives of all the displaced.
D. Conclusion
The health systems of El Salvador and Nicaragua underwent major changes as a
result of the revolutions and counterrevolutions of the 1980s. The popular health systems
that the FMLN and FSLN promoted saw the expansion of community-level health access.

162

For more information on the attack of the Calle Real camp, see Margaret Swedish and
Marie Dennis, Like Grains of Wheat: A Spirituality of Solidarity (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis
Books, 2004); see also David Hartsough and Joyce Hollyday, Waging Peace: Global
Adventures of a Lifelong Activist, (Oakland: PM Press, 2014). The account by Swedish
and Dennis notes that the song “Don’t Put Your Pictures Away” by Francisco Herrera
ends with an audio recording of the gunfire shot at Calle Real.
53

In Nicaragua, significant improvements resulted from the new system, while in El
Salvador, revolutionary forces struggled to maintain health systems in the face of brutal
government repression. Solidarity workers played an important role in maintaining the
medical networks and supply chains for each country. Internationalist solidarity propped
up the community-based revolutionary movement toward healthcare access for all.
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CHAPTER 3
HEALTHCARE SOLIDARITY
“It’s not really revolutionary, it’s not really transformative unless we transform our
relationship with power.” 163 – Susan Classen
Within the Central American solidarity movement lay a subgroup of doctors,
nurses, community health workers, and others who sent medicine and essential supplies
to ensure the functioning of healthcare systems. Some of these activists remained in the
United States raising funds and awareness. Others recognized the value of their skill set
and made the journey south to offer a helping hand to those in need. Lois Wessel, an
activist who lived in Nicaragua from 1985-1991, identified this division in solidarity,
saying that for “a U.S. citizen, there’s sort of two sides to the solidarity movement. One
side with people living in the United States and one side with people living, in my case,
in Nicaragua.”164 There remained, for both groups, a firm belief that the best way to
combat the violence was by healing. For many activists involved in health care in both El
Salvador and Nicaragua, there were two main goals. The first was direct: offering
services as a doctor or nurse to treat sick and injured patients. The most important goal of
these workers, however, was building up the capacity for health work within
communities. This was revolutionary work. Sandy Smith-Nonini writes that the building
of public health capacity in the war zones of El Salvador, “arose in part out of necessity,
and in part out of the openness to new ideologies created by the polarization and the
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influence initially of church workers and later of urban and ‘internationalist’ health
professionals.”165 The internationalists played a central role in promoting the revolution
that was popular health.
This chapter focuses on those solidarity workers who looked to build up the
healthcare capacity of El Salvador and Nicaragua. They understood that helping to build
a lasting system would carry far beyond their own capacity to care for individual sick and
wounded; that solidarity is most effective when those involved see each other as equals;
that real change is effected through institution building, and such building must be
steered by those most affected. Moreover, they saw the people of Nicaragua and El
Salvador as agents of change capable of determining their own needs and improving their
own situation. Despite the violence Salvadorans and Nicaraguans endured, they wanted
to improve their lives and their communities, and healthcare solidarity workers helped
make this improvement possible by engaging with communities in extended and
meaningful ways.
A. “Working in the Solidarity Model”
As Nicaraguans and Salvadorans defined their revolutionary goals, solidarity
activists from all over the world stepped in to lend a helping hand. Doctors, nurses,
community health planners, and other activists made major impacts by offering their
abilities to achieve community-set healthcare goals. Many of those who became integral
to improving medical care passionately followed what Dr. Arnold Matlin refers to as the
“solidarity model.” Matlin explained that this model is when “you work within the
system, you don’t set up a shop and say here we are bringing you the gifts of American

165

Smith-Nonini, Healing the Body Politic, 75.
56

medicine. You go to medical people in the community and you say ‘how can we help
you’ and then they’ll tell you, and then that’s what you should do.”166 Lois Wessel
decided not to return to Nicaragua after training as a nurse in part because of her
commitment to community agency. In describing her decision, she states:
One of the reasons I ended up not going back in that public health capacity was as
much as I adored the people I worked with, I didn’t want to be the gringo who
kinda flew in on an airplane and stayed at a nice hotel and told people how to run
their health projects. I didn’t see myself doing that, I felt like health projects
needed to be more what the people wanted do and not what the funders wanted to
do.167
Focusing on what health goals the people of a community wanted and needed
made for effective solidarity. Of course, asking the people what they wanted more
broadly was important, too. Health care, though, was a realm in which the people could
assert their needs and revolutionary goals, particularly during a decade when health care
financially and practically took a backseat to warfare. Following the solidarity model,
then, by working on health care at a grass roots level, or, at the least, with a grass roots
mentality, helped make the revolutions efficacious. Solidarity workers who clung to this
model played a pivotal, if not always leading, role in encouraging and assisting in the
revolutionary health goals of the people. In that way, health care solidarity between the
U.S., Nicaragua, and El Salvador proved effective and truly radical.
B. The Work of Health Internationalists
Arnold Matlin has been to Nicaragua over thirty-five times since his first visit in
1988. He still visits Nicaragua every year, and he and his wife continue to support health

166

Arnold Matlin (U.S. doctor and solidarity activist), interview by author, October 23,
2019, phone interview.
167
Lois Wessel, interview by author, October 24, 2019, phone interview.
57

care in the country. In 2004, Matlin was awarded the Hero of the Revolution award from
the Sandinistas, the only North American to ever receive such an honor. His commitment
to supporting the revolutionary goals for health care set out by the Sandinista government
in the 1980s came alongside his deep belief in following the solidarity model. Matlin
exemplifies the important work done by healthcare solidarity activists in Central
America. Many of those who spent time in Nicaragua or El Salvador had a similar
mindset, and they often worked for, or even started, organizations that funded and
promoted such grass-roots ways of thinking. This chapter in no way outlines all of the
people and organizations that committed to medical aid. Instead, it looks to how
healthcare workers managed to encourage the revolutionary goals of the people through
their solidarity work.
1. Exchanging Ideas
The Committee for Health Rights in Central America (CHRICA), later
Committee for Health Rights in the Americas, the National Central America Health
Rights Network (NCAHRN), MINSA, and Federacion de Trabajadores de Salud
(Federation of Health Workers, FETSALUD), came together to “support the new
Sandinista government’s efforts to provide medical care to the impoverished majority,”
and to “inform the U.S. public of what was taking place.”168 After consulting with
MINSA and Managua’s medical school, CHRICA decided the most effective course of
action “was to hold a large colloquium or conference in Managua, which would create a
forum for exchange among U.S. and Nicaraguan health professionals about state-of-the-
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art medical care.”169 These colloquia, held annually for ten years starting in 1983,
asserted important moral support for Nicaraguan health workers and “generated myriad
other collaborative efforts” between the U.S. and Nicaragua.170
U.S. and Nicaraguan medical professionals gathered at the North AmericanNicaragua Health Colloquia. U.S.-born public health activist, Maria Hamlin Zuniga,
noted that the goal of these colloquia was to introduce “the kinds of things that were
going on in modern medicine that Nicaraguans were not able to get.” Moreover:
the colloqui[a] dealt with many different kinds of things. People came and helped
people understand more modern scientific thought on different diseases, helped
with the women’s groups for sexual health and reproductive health, and for how
to deal with trauma,… how to deal with anxiety and depression, how to deal with
the huge number of people who we had who were suffering loss of limbs because
of the war.171
The colloquia brought healthcare solidarity activists and Nicaraguan health workers
together to exchange ideas. This gave Nicaraguans, seamed in by sanctions, access to
content otherwise unavailable to them. The colloquia were held in part to expose U.S.
health workers to the realities of Nicaraguan medicine. Visiting medical professionals
saw the progress of the Sandinista policies and the destruction wrought by the Contras,
and, in response, they returned home eager to advocate in favor of the FSLN.
The student newspaper Synapse, published out of the University of California San
Francisco, wrote of a delegation sent by the university to the October 1982 health
colloquium. Delegates reported that, “we went to provide updated medical information
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on a broad range of topics and to observe firsthand the health conditions in the country.”
They said that “the most important aspect of our experience was the realization that
Nicaragua is at war.”172 An Ann Arbor publication reported in April 1986, that “North
American health professionals returning from a recent health colloquium in Managua
confirm the crisis caused by both the shortage of medical materials and displacement of
health personnel resulting from the war.”173
These delegates returned from Nicaragua with such a sense of injustice that they
often founded new organizations that helped spur the U.S. outcry against U.S.
intervention in Central America. According to Matlin, “once we travelled to Nicaragua
and saw the reality, we were hooked.” In fact, Matlin, along with a colleague, founded
the Ciudad Hermana Taskforce in response to his initial experience as a delegate. The
taskforce, which formed a vital sister city link between the Nicaragua town, El Sauce,
and Rochester, New York, still exists today.174
As these examples show, healthcare solidarity was vital to the Central American
solidarity movement. Though not all organizations were health-focused, all were
impacted by the voices of delegates who travelled to the country to attend health
colloquia and witness the reality of health care for a country under siege. The Nicaraguan
government supported such delegations because they saw how potent such solidarity
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could be in impacting U.S. policy and curbing the economic squeeze that hindered the
FSLN’s capacity for change.
Dr. Jill Winegardner, a neuropsychologist, began travelling to Nicaragua in 1988
through an organization known as The Training Exchange. Rather than treat patients, the
goal of the exchange “was to support healthcare professionals who provided training, not
just service, but [to leave] a legacy of training to their Nicaraguan counterparts.” It was
through the exchange process that Winegardner was able to return to Nicaragua and
eventually move there. From the beginning, she was involved in supporting cutting-edge
growth in the country. She notes that on her first visit, she helped form “a society called
the Nicaraguan Neuropsychological Society, or Association… of the psychologists who
had just started learning neuropsychology.” Additionally, she “taught weekly classes,
usually at the rehab hospital,… visited the individual psychologists in the class in their
places of work,… did some tutoring at the University of Central America, and [helped
with] their theses and their projects in neuropsychology.”175
For Winegardner, the purpose of her time in Nicaragua was supportive, not
controlling – assistive, not prescriptive. “It was all training. That was the whole purpose
of the project, not to do actual clinical work, but to train.”176 Winegardner introduced a
new field of medical practice to Nicaragua. In that process, she easily could have chosen
to assert her own expertise and beliefs onto the psychologists she helped to train. But
Winegardner and the program she worked through understood the significance of
solidarity and the importance of not domineering, regardless of her own background.
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2. U.S.-Based Solidarity Actions
U.S.-based groups often engaged in solidarity by shipping supplies to Central
America. Nicaraguans struggled to access basic goods as well as medical supplies in the
face of U.S. sanctions. Winegardner notes that lacking basic supplies was a “constant”
while she was in Nicaragua. “There was always a problem getting supplies, getting
goods, getting medicines, getting anything. And in my specialized little area, you know,
though I didn’t use medicines, the basic materials like paper and pencil, or a typewriter,
those kinds of things were not always in easy supply.”177 In response, Lois Wessel notes,
“there were people filling up containers and shipping [them] to Nicaragua that had
important things, whether it was medicine, or clothing.”178 Groups that raised funds and
shipped materials to Central America, then, were vital in the maintenance of the
healthcare system.
The Nicaragua Medical Aid Project (NMAP) stated as its main goal the collection
of “medical supplies and money to meet specific requests by health care facilities in
Nicaragua.” In 1986, the Ann Arbor-based group described its work with Nicaragua as:
Delivering requested medical supplies to the Hospital Infantil in Managua and to
rural health centers…repairing microscopes throughout Nicaragua and providing
spare parts…buying pharmaceuticals at 3% of cost through the Medicines for
Central America Fund…sending emergency medical kits for use in war zones and
rural health posts…contributing to the purchase of generators for health care
facilities needing electric power… [and ]supplying repair parts for U.S. made
medical equipment.179
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In April 1986, NMAP participated in a regional caravan that converged in Milwaukee
with supplies to fill a 20-ton shipping container for Nicaragua.180 In October of the same
year, NMAP sent a delegation to Nicaragua with “several hundred pounds of medical
equipment and pharmaceuticals.”181
NCAHRN funded organizations capable of delivering medications to Central
America. The Medicines for Central America Fund (MCAF), sent “hundreds of
thousands of dollars of supplies” and promised donors that every “dollar donated”
purchased “$30 of urgently needed medicines.” NCAHRN also worked with Insulin for
Life in “response to an urgent need in Nicaragua,” to deliver “monthly supplies of
insulin” to the country (Appendix A).182
Many other U.S.-based organizations raised funds and collected materials to send
to Central American countries, particularly El Salvador and Nicaragua. A 1987 Directory
of Central America Organizations, published by the Central America Resource Center in
Austin, Texas, shows that medical support came from a wide geographic spread in the
United States. Many organizations were based in the big cities of California, in Chicago,
in New York, and in Boston, but activists organized in smaller regions as well. For
example, Missoula, Montana hosted the Montana Committee for Health Rights in Central
America and Medical Aid to Central America was based in Madison, Wisconsin.183
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These organizations played a vital role in upholding the integrity of medical systems
constantly threatened by lack of resources.
3. Organizations without a Focus on Medicine
Many solidarity organizations and activists engaged health promotion without
focusing exclusively on issues of medical access. The Committee in Solidarity with the
People of El Salvador (CISPES), a prominent U.S.-based organization to present, focused
on preventing U.S.-invasion, a goal immortalized by the slogan “El Salvador is Spanish
for Vietnam.”184 Though CISPES focused on political advocacy and broad support of the
FMLN and grassroots organizing, they also promoted health care via the Bravo Fund.
The Bravo Fund, in turn, used the money from CISPES to fund training and the
Alejandra Bravo Field Hospital in Chalatenango.185
At times, activists with little background in public health, found themselves
engaged in healthcare solidarity. Aynn Setright travelled to Nicaragua with Witness for
Peace (WP) in 1985 with a mind to shift U.S. policy. WP, founded in 1983 in opposition
to Reagan’s support for the Contras, “brought thousands of people to Nicaragua to
provide protective accompaniment to communities at risk and to document the effects of
the U.S.-supported war.”186 Neither WP nor Setright focused exclusively on medicine and
health, but through WP, Setright found herself driving an ambulance in central Nicaragua
for a town called Bocana de Paiwas. “Catholic relief services had provided the parish
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with an ambulance, and the red cross didn’t want to be in that zone because it was too
conflictual, and MINSA every time they sent an ambulance out, it was ambushed.” The
parish requested, through WP, that someone be sent to drive the ambulance.187
C. Solidarity Based in Central America
In 1982, Maria Hamlin Zuniga, a public health worker who has lived in Central
America since 1968, helped establish the organization, Centro de Información y Servicios
de Asesoría en Salud (Center for Information and Advisory Services in Health, CISAS).
CISAS “was organized to provide health education and work[ed] with communities on
community empowerment around health.” The organization exists today, and works in
the cities and surrounding areas of Managua, León, and El Viejo. At the same time as she
founded CISAS, Hamlin Zuniga worked at MINSA and helped to coordinate
internationalist solidarity workers to the health programs run by the Ministry. She notes
that “especially during the 80s, [CISAS] collaborated with the different people who were
coming to the country to provide services,” though the main bulk of connections CISAS
made were with “popular organizations, women’s organizations, women, youth, children
and the community or community defense committees that were set up at that time and
later were converted into the Nicaraguan Communal Movement [Movimiento Comunal
Nicaragüense].” 188
While CISAS remains a community-oriented organization, many solidarity
workers joined the organization during the 1980s. Hamlin Zuniga has long been adopted
as a Central American, but she worked with many activists who lived in the region for
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shorter stints. Lois Wessel became involved in CISAS in the late 1980s and describes the
organization as “a very hands-on health education center that does a lot of education
using really participatory techniques, so theater, and dance, and song, to teach.”189
Mark Smith, a public health and environmental activist, and Susan Classen helped
found the Comisión Diocesana de la Pastoral en Salud de Chalatenango (Diocesan Health
Commission of Chalatenango Province, CODIPSA). Founded in El Salvador in 1988,190
the organization responded to the health needs of repopulating and repatriating
populations. CODIPSA, under the protection of the Catholic Church, focused on training
community health workers and rebuilding the infrastructure that had been destroyed.
CODIPSA coordinated numerous two-day training sessions, vaccination campaigns, and
convivencias (two day retreats for volunteer health workers to learn new skills), in
addition to procuring medicine and supplies from San Salvador.
Smith helped coordinate trainings and ensure that medications remained stocked.
To get the supplies back to Chalatenango, he would leave San Salvador in the early
morning hours in hopes that guards at the checkpoints would be asleep when he passed
through. Though he was questioned at times, he never had the medications taken by the
Salvadoran military. Smith worked on campaigns with CODIPSA where the volunteers
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carried pingüinos (coolers full of vaccinations) obtained from the Salvadoran Ministry of
Health into rural Chalatenango.191
Both Susan Classen and Mark Smith worked to coordinate and host trainings for
local health volunteers. This aspect of CODIPSA’s mission focused on the long-term
goal of health sustainability so important to effective solidarity work. According to
Smith, the local two-day trainings were created for “semi-literate populations” to
“recognize and treat disease,” particularly relating to upper respiratory issues and
parasitic infections.192 Susan Classen worked under CODIPSA in a region called Las
Vueltas. She was responsible for training health workers in villages located along a
sixteen kilometer corridor.193
Hamlin Zuniga participated in the founding of the Comité Regional de Promoción
de Salud Comunitaria (Regional Committee for the Promotion of Community Health), an
organization founded in Guatemala and that worked clandestinely until 1987 when it first
participated publicly in an International Women’s meeting.194 The idea for a committee
came about in 1975 and encouraged solidarity between health workers and systems in
Central America.195 The committee worked largely in secret because of the violence and
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oppression in the region during the 1970s and 1980s, particularly targeting health
workers. That same violence made the committee an indispensable resource. In speaking
about the committee, Hamlin Zuniga noted: “During the years of armed conflict in
Central America, that particular committee was essential to permit people working in…
community health, health promotion, [and] health education to come together under very
difficult circumstances, but to come together and learn from one another, and… it
continues to work to this day, so obviously it had sustainability.”
Hamlin Zuniga emphasized that the committee is not an organization, but rather a
network. Through this work, Hamlin Zuniga and her colleagues created a vital link
between health workers of Central American nations that boosted the capacity of each
country’s respective health system. In explaining the four main activities of the
committee during the 1980s, Hamlin Zuniga stated:
The idea was to train community health workers to carry out programs and the
like because most worked in development programs… One of the purposes of the
committee was to help these individuals and these organizations that they
belonged to… What we wanted to do was that in each of the different countries
[of Central America], they organize themselves in coordination at the national
level so that they could help one another and then when that was done, they
became part of a coordinating committee to carry out the strategic planning and
programming for the committee as a whole. The committee had as its main
activities regional encounters [meetings] around specific themes that were
identified by the people who were in the committee and then each country would
send people to these regional encounters… The third kind of activity that we had
was the interchange between people working in different programs in different
countries and that was very important during the repression because that way
people from countries in conflict could go and live for a while in health programs
in other countries that were not in conflict and be able to learn from that
experience. And the fourth kind of activity… was the production and the
promotion of educational materials.196
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The Regional Committee is a healthcare solidarity organization for Central
Americans, by Central Americans. Hamlin Zuniga and her colleagues recognized the
revolutionary power of health care, and so they encouraged communities to take charge
of their physical wellbeing and, consequently, shape Central American revolutions to
their own needs. In her 2003 popular history of the Regional Committee, Hamlin Zuniga
chronicles the formation of the committee and its focus on community health, which was
a response to oppression and a part of the revolutionary actions taken by the Sandinistas
and the people.197
D. Cultural and Economic Struggles for Health Internationalists
“I was pushed to compromise what would be an appropriate level of work… to
accommodate circumstances [in Nicaragua], but if I did that, I knew the country
wouldn’t go forward.”198 – Dr. Jill Winegardner
For each of the workers accounted for here, respecting the wishes, desires, and
knowledge of local populations was crucial to building effective health systems; the
activists never placed themselves as central to the process. When asked how she dealt
with Salvadoran beliefs that directly contradicted her medical knowledge, Susan Classen
responded, “that was the ocean that we swam in.”199 Classen epitomized a fundamental
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challenge that healthcare solidarity workers faced. Even as they saw that the best way
forward was to build health systems according to the needs and desires of communities,
they struggled with the cultural divisions that existed between their own beliefs about
medicine and those of the locals. Many of these workers, who had been raised and
educated in the U.S. or Canada, had difficulty deciding when to push back against
harmful local practices and when to respect and recognize the efficacy of other practices.
While working alongside guerilla and community health workers in El Salvador,
Charles Clements recognized that he “was the only fully educated doctor in the region.”
Many of the health workers had only basic training in general health, but most were well
experienced in handling the injuries prevalent in the war zone. Clements recognized his
own limitations as well as strengths in the situation, and rather than viewing himself as
the regional expert, he saw his “role as a complement to this system.”200 Even so, friction
existed for Clements as he navigated his role as a doctor and an outsider.
Like many healthcare activists, Clements faced a slew of local beliefs detrimental
to health practices. In his memoir, he writes:
What I didn’t then understand is that in El Salvador medical treatment is viewed
as a semi-mystical affair in which every ache or pain is treated with a pill or an
injection, if possible. The practice is not fostered by doctors; most rural
Salvadorans have never seen a doctor. It is a result of medicines of every type
being urged on the people by over-the-counter diagnosticians. Product safety
regulation is unknown in that country.201
Many other activists echo Clement’s experience. Susan Classen stated that aside from
traditional “folklore beliefs,” the belief that “injections and IVs are better than pills”
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permeated the expectations Salvadorans had of medical practitioners.202 Classen also
encountered misunderstandings about the nature of medications. When talking about
administering pills to patients, she noted that many misunderstood the differences
between kinds of pills: “The red pill is better than the brown one, everybody wanted
vitamins and somebody had a couple leftover antibiotics, so they’d give it to somebody
else who had a cold.”203 Many of these issues arose because the populations had little
access to medical care and education prior to the 1980s.
Financial realities impacted Central Americans and activists, both in accessing
supplies and in offering sufficient training. Jill Winegardner noted that in Nicaragua, “the
financial imperatives… were really severe. So things like, in advanced countries, we have
private offices, we have telephones, we have paper, we have test materials, we have
secretaries, we have phones, and there, none of those things would be taken for granted.”
Access to supplies, including neuropsychological tests, was restricted, but those tests that
were available often did not fit with financial realities of the patients. Winegardner noted
that, “for neuropsychology, there’s a lot of norming that has to be done, so a lot of these
tests didn’t have appropriate norms for use in Nicaragua, so we had to develop some of
our own norms and think up some of our own tests.” For example, a boy with no formal
education but with extensive experience selling goods on the streets may not be able to
pass a test created for a population assumed to have basic math skills, but exchanging
money would be a task that neuropsychologists could use as a test for him.204
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Winegardner’s students also faced financial difficulties that made proper training
impossible in some cases. In her time training students, she encountered one particularly
difficult situation:
I had a pair of students who were doing a thesis and one of them didn’t come to
the meetings because her family had a little stall at the oriental market there and
they had gotten robbed a couple times, and so she couldn’t leave it. And so I had
this dilemma that you wouldn’t have in the U.S. Everyone [in Nicaragua] told me
to pass her anyway even though she didn’t do the work, because of her family
difficulty and the financial necessity of her staying at the market. But on the other
hand, I would perpetuate untrained psychologists, and I really didn’t want to do
that, so I ended up not passing her, because she hadn’t achieved the level of work
needed. But people were really angry about that. Those kinds of things have an
impact on health care as well.205
Healthcare solidarity workers faced difficult and often unpopular decisions like that
which Winegardner made with her student. Determining when and how to interject
knowledge and insist on professional expectations was difficult in both El Salvador and
Nicaragua because of cultural differences, financial difficulties and, most of all, because
of the violence and oppression facing both populations. Nonetheless, Winegardner, and
other activists, continued to work within a solidarity model, trying to limit the imposition
of their own belief systems, listening to the desires of the local community, but also
choosing to push the healthcare systems forward in effective ways.
At times, the differing belief systems and regulations allowed activists to help in
unique ways. While working in Managua, Lois Wessel spent a year apprenticing with a
Uruguayan obstetrician-gynecologist. Wessel summarized the experience by saying, “I
would just show up at the hospital when [the OB/gyn] was working and she let me
deliver babies… that would never happen now, like who the hell are you, someone off
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the street, delivering babies.”206 Susan Classen notes that in her time as a nurse and then
training healthcare workers, she and her colleagues “did try hard to work with medicinal
plants and lift up that kind of response because a lot of those are not just part of the belief
system, they do actually work. So that was one way of trying to work with and not just
work against.”207 Promoting natural remedies worked in part because it embraced more
traditional beliefs and in part because it responded effectively to shortages in medicine.
However, not all activists found the communities they worked in receptive to the use of
herbal remedies. In his time in El Salvador, Clements routinely promoted natural options
that communities were slow to accept:
The peasants were skeptical at the introduction of natural remedies. Their
forebears… had been conversant with the pharmacopaeia growing wild around
them. Almost any of their grandparents had ten times the knowledge of natural
medicine that I possessed, but that lore had been lost with the advent of easily
available drug-store remedies. The willow bark tea was slow to catch on, as was
the sedative we showed them how to brew from the leaves of the mock orange
tree. Despite the fact that stomach gas, acidity, and ulcer-like pain were common
complaints, they showed little interest in learning how to prepare an antacid from
the fine ash of their cooking fires.208
What the two contradicting experiences show about working in the war zones of El
Salvador is just how adaptable and open-minded healthcare solidarity workers needed to
be in order to achieve results.
Dr. Francisco Metzi writes that he became most effective in teaching and
treatment when he embraced the beliefs of the local populations, rather than fighting or
ignoring them. He writes: “In the middle of class one day, it suddenly occurred to me that
I was looking at the problem completely backwards. It wasn’t these young women who
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should sit back and absorb what I taught, but rather, I should learn from them.” This new
way of thinking, he says, “radically changed not only my teaching style, but also my
relationship to the community as a whole… this proved to be the key to making my work
more useful.”209 Moreover, because Metzi aimed to plant the seeds of a successful
healthcare system that would take root for the populations of El Salvador he temporarily
served, he realized that engaging with civilian beliefs was not just more effective, but
imperative. He writes that the new teaching method had a political imperative achieved
by “starting from the base of knowledge that already exist[ed] among the people, even if
it [was] not always interpreted correctly.”210 Building students’ confidence in their own
medical knowledge and capability would serve the community for longer than Metzi
realized he could. This way of thinking allowed Metzi to engage the solidarity model on a
deeper level. Many healthcare activists worked in medicine because they believed that
contributing their time and skills would help promote the revolution, and though they
often struggled with cultural and economic restrictions, they remained flexible, finding
ingenious ways to build lasting networks in Central America.
E. Clinics and Hospitals: Sites of Revolution
“The hospitals are the result of a community effort, a symbol of the people’s
accomplishment.”211 – Francisco Metzi
Solidarity activists so often found themselves working in medicine because
hospitals and clinics were sites of revolution. In both El Salvador and Nicaragua, medical
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facilities were considered revolutionary and targeted by the Salvadoran military and the
Contras, respectively. Building a clinic in the war zones was revolutionary; driving the
ambulance with sick and wounded on treacherous, land-mine-pocked roads, was
revolutionary; the very act of seeking out care at a clinic was revolutionary. Most
importantly, these were sites of revolution not only for the Sandinista and FMLN
leadership, but also for the people. Communities chose to build health clinics together,
solidarity workers helped run and train these clinics, and in so doing, the people of
Central America were taking revolutionary stances against systems of oppression.
While working as a doctor and healthcare trainer on the front lines of the conflict
in El Salvador, Metzi noted the importance of hospitals to Salvadoran communities.
These hospitals were, he writes, “more like a neighborhood café, where friends get
together after a late night political meeting.” They resembled small clinics, often piled
high with trash, and with inconsistent equipment and supplies across different
communities.212 In El Salvador, communities created these clinics, and, as Metzi notes,
they were proud of them despite the danger they drew. Metzi states:
Everyone has contributed something towards [the hospital’s] construction. The
civilians have pointed out the safest location for it and then helped build it. They
have also helped carry the wounded there; the crops from their fields have
supplied its provisions. As for the militiamen and the combatants, they have
risked their lives to protect it, while teams from logistics have lugged heavy
backpacks full of medical supplies over dangerous backwoods trails.213
Solidarity workers often took on the role of secreting supplies to the clinics and training
community workers to staff them. Solidarity workers fit neatly into a broader system that
brought medical care to war-torn El Salvador and Nicaragua. These workers and
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community members made the revolutionary goals a reality. The FMLN wanted to
provide health care for all, but they hardly had the capacity to do so as they carried out
guerilla operations. It was the people who made the revolution real.
In Nicaragua, hospitals and clinics served as sites of revolution, as well. In the
war zones, clinics were attacked by Contras, and so there, too, the very act of seeking
medical help was revolutionary. Throughout the rest of the country, as the FSLN was
forced to divert funds and attention away from stated health imperatives, the people
seized on revolutionary fervor by demanding proper health care. The FSLN provided the
framework, but the people carried out the daily revolutionary goals. Winegardner saw
this take place at the government-run, rehabilitation hospital she worked at in Managua.
She states:
So Nicaragua was really a country where at that point because of the revolution,
people were speaking up for their rights, loud and strong so in the rehab hospital,
one week or two weeks, we couldn’t have classes because the patients went on
strike because they didn’t like one of the doctors… Nowhere but in Nicaragua is
that going to happen… The patients won. They said ‘no, this doctor’s not good
enough, we should get a change’ and that’s what happened… I think that was the
best example of anything that showed the impact of the revolution on day-to-day
life. These are hospital patients, they aren’t revolutionary actors or anything, but
they knew their rights to good health care, and so they demanded them.214
While the patients may not have been revolutionary actors in a traditional way – none
were guerilla fighters or high-level Sandinistas – they were in fact revolutionary actors.
They carried out the soul of revolution by demanding better treatment. They were
Nicaraguan citizens, they were patients, and they were the people who made the
revolution happen.
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F. Conclusion
“Public health was the midwife of Marxism.” 215 –Richard Horton
This chapter has posited that the rural clinics and urban hospitals of war-torn El
Salvador and Nicaragua were key sites of revolution. Healthcare solidarity activists
played a key role in this revolutionary motion, and they also offered a clear window
through which to view the efforts of the people. Sandy Smith-Nonini argues that
“Friedrich Engels’s 1845 study, The Condition of the Working Class in England, was the
first scholarly effort to examine the health of the public as both materially related to
capitalist expansion and a site for revolutionary struggle.”216 Though the revolution in
Nicaragua was not Marxist, the people did see public health in a revolutionary light. The
FMLN, more firmly grounded in Marxist thought, promoted public health as
revolutionary, and the people carried out the call. Moreover, U.S. solidarity activists
turned against the policies and actions of their country to support the health revolutions of
Central America. Understanding the revolutionary nature of free and accessible health
care, and the radical idea that community-based health care should be promoted, is
integral to understanding how the people of El Salvador and Nicaragua experienced and
engaged with revolution, and why so many healthcare workers and public health
promoters chose to devote themselves to the cause.
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CHAPTER 4
GENDERING SOLIDARITY AND HEALTH CARE
“Health work helped move women into new social roles, and liberated many from
patriarchal oversight.”217 – Sandy Smith-Nonini
The women of El Salvador and Nicaragua navigated the political terrain of the
1980s by interpreting revolutionary rhetoric as an answer to their particular needs. Health
care often figured as a central tenet of these feminisms in part because women held
responsibility for the health of their family and their own reproductive health, and in part
because women as nurses and volunteer health workers stepped into positions of
leadership in their communities. This reality looked different in Nicaragua and El
Salvador, but the result in both countries was the creation and mobilization of feminist
networks that established health clinics, programs, and campaigns to respond to the needs
of women and their children. In Nicaragua, the state often supported the efforts; in El
Salvador, the guerillas and civilian revolutionaries worked together to promote a feminist
agenda. As women navigated the complexities of wartime in both countries, they stepped
into positions of leadership as healthcare workers in both hospitals and community
clinics. As revolutionaries and counterrevolutionaries fought over ideologies including
the right to access health care, women made those rights a reality for themselves, for their
children, and for their communities.
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A. Scholarship
Scholarship disagrees over whether women actively constructed a space for their
needs within the revolutionary movements of Nicaragua and El Salvador. Some feminist
scholars have argued that the revolutions were less a breaking of chains for women and
more a restructuring of power for men, which resulted in a relative shift for women. In
1985, Maxine Molyneux wrote of Nicaragua that “if the revolution did not demand the
dissolution of women’s identities, it did require the subordination of their specific
interests to the broader goals of overthrowing Somoza and establishing a new social
order.”218 Rather than challenging gender roles, Molyneux argued that to “the traditional
roles of housewife and mother have been added those of full-time wage worker and
political activist,” meaning that women continued to support traditional gender roles
while also propagating the revolutionary state. 219 This argument is indicative of
Molyneux’s idea of feminine versus feminist. Molyneux, and others after her, have
argued that “Feminine demands alleviate women’s roles as caretakers, while feminist
demands explicitly challenge sexism.”220
Scholarship also criticizes the Asociación de Mujeres Nicaragüenses ‘Luisa
Armanda Espinoza’ (Association of Nicaraguan Women Luisa Armanda Espinoza,
AMNLAE), the prominent Nicaraguan women’s organization under the FSLN. Jennifer
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Leigh Disney argues that “a patriarchal political culture” permeated and impeded the
AMNLAE.221
In El Salvador, argues Ilja A. Luciak, women “joined the FMLN to change
prevailing social conditions, and almost all of them served in supporting roles.”222 Even
so, women “constituted 27 to 34 percent of the FMLN membership.”223 Minimizing these
women’s contributions by saying that they held primarily supporting roles is a disservice.
Their decision to support the FMLN in whatever capacity developed from a nuanced set
of choices and ideas about their position in Salvadoran society; they pursued their own
needs, whatever roles they accepted. Moreover, women in health care often played
leading roles, a fact ignored by scholars who assume that women were relegated to
subordinate positions.
Other scholarship argues that women navigated the revolutions in ways that
benefitted them. Diana Carolina Sierra Becerra contends that Salvadoran women defined
their own feminist praxis through the Asociación de Mujeres de El Salvador (Association
of Women of El Salvador, AMES). Sierra Becerra claims that AMES “redefined
socialist revolution to mean the overthrow of both capitalism and patriarchy, and
mobilized women to shape the everyday and long-term trajectory of the revolutionary
process.”224 She notes that AMES organized “combatants, peasants, and militants in
exiles,” alongside solidarity workers “from Mexico, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and the
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United States,” to develop new feminist practices of revolution.225 Further, she argues
that the feminist-feminine dichotomy “can obscure their intimate relationship.”226 This
chapter follows with Sierra Becerra’s interpretation by assuming that the health needs of
women and their children were both a feminist and a feminine issue, but that women
chose to use health care as platform from which to engage feminist ideology.
Margaret Randall argues that in Nicaragua, “women developed a consciousness of
themselves as women and of the important role they could play in the fight against
Somoza.”227 In prefacing her collection of interviews with Sandinista women, Randall
states that the women’s stories “force us to stretch the notion of what is political so as to
include issues usually hidden and dismissed as personal.”228 This includes women’s
efforts to develop community health programs that focused on women’s and children’s
health.
Considering how women engaged with health care offers one way of
understanding the revolutions of the 1980s. In both countries, women pursued the
development of healthcare systems that responded to their and their family’s needs. Even
as violence limited resources and destroyed infrastructure, women prioritized health
needs as mothers, health workers, and solidarity activists. They chose to interpret
revolutionary ideology in their favor, and they embraced opportunities for leadership that
broke with more traditional ideas about the role of women.
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Women took up the call for universal health care access for themselves and their
children, not in order to carry out the requests of men. Sierra Becerra argues that AMES
developed a feminist praxis that embraced women’s health issues as central to the efforts
of shaping the Salvadoran revolution. Moreover, women centered reproduction and in
“the guerilla territories and refugee camps, AMES politicized reproductive labor.”229
Sierra Becerra further contends that “the top FMLN leadership did not monopolize the
goals of the revolution.”230 In Nicaragua, the FSLN pursued access to health care as a
central tenet, but women defined what that care looked like, and in the process, they
carved out new leadership roles for themselves. Women’s reproductive needs, and the
health needs of their children, were hardly subordinate to the male rallying cries in either
country. This chapter assesses how women came to understand their place in society
differently in part because of newly developing healthcare systems.
B. Gendered Impacts of Healthcare Instability
Violence and revolution impacted women’s health more drastically than men’s
because of women’s entrenched position as reproductive laborers in Salvadoran and
Nicaraguan society. As women faced different physical realities than their male
counterparts, they also responded in ways to address those reproductive health needs and
the health needs of their children. The reality for women in both El Salvador and
Nicaragua was a greater physical toll, a rupture with traditional ways of life, and inhibited
access to health care. Understanding how women fit into the revolution is essential to
untangling their relationship with healthcare development.
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1. El Salvador
While the FMLN promoted gender equality and access to health care, the
Salvadoran government saw neither as important tenets. Even as the FMLN attempted to
implement healthcare networks in the guerilla-controlled areas, violence and lack of
access to medical supplies made the task difficult. For many Salvadoran women, this
either meant an inability to afford health care in the government-controlled hospitals or a
shortage of care in the guerilla-controlled territories.
The Salvadoran government targeted poor and indigenous women by denying
health care and by imposing ideas about reproductive health that built on racist and
classist notions. A group of American doctors writing on the state of maternal health in
1982 reported on a state-run facility:
At the Maternity Hospital [sic] we observed about 20 women in various stages of
labor. Two or three women occupied each bed. Women in labor sat together on a
hard bench until shortly before delivery, when they walked up a steep flight of
stairs to the delivery room. If they could not pay the fee for admission to the
hospital and for medications,they [sic] were sent home immediately after they had
delivered.231
Sterilization of these women was an issue in El Salvador. “In a 1981 bulletin, [The
Reproductive Rights National Network] reported on the forced-sterilization campaigns of
the US government against both American and Salvadoran women.” Sierra Becerra
argues that the Salvadoran government “did not forcibly sterilize women,” but that “it did
actively promote sterilization over other means of contraception.”232 At the very least, the
threat of sterilization kept women away from state-run hospitals. Susan Classen notes that
during her time working as a nurse and public health promoter in Chalatenango, she
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encountered many women afraid of sterilization. According to Classen, “At every step
hospital workers try to convince the women to be sterilized.”233 Classen’s observations
indicate that the reality for many women was a choice between harassment and receiving
care or avoiding the discomfort but forfeiting medical care.
Moreover, state-run hospitals at times dismissed the suffering of poor women
using racist and classist logic. Classen tells of one poor woman, Felícita, who only saw a
doctor after her fifth visit to the hospital, and only when Classen went with her. Felícita
needed surgery for a prolapsed uterus and was able to get the blood needed for the
surgery because Classen “was a foreigner with influence.”234 Another woman named
Marta watched her twelve-year old daughter waste away from malnutrition and diarrhea.
Marta and her daughter had been turned away by doctors at the hospital who kicked them
out because they were “dirty Indians”. Classen argues that Marta was “considered the
scum of the earth, poor, an Indian, a woman, displaced, no husband,” and that her
daughter was “killed by the violence of poverty.”235
The lack of health care for families burdened women more than men. “Older
women, mothers with young children, and elderly persons comprised a significant portion
of civilians within the liberated territories.”236 The limited infrastructure in place for
Salvadoran peasants prior to the violence of the 1970s and 1980s resulted in poor health
that was only exacerbated with the mass destruction of the war years. Young children
suffered malnutrition in high rates, a reality that fell upon women to manage. Marta,

233

Classen, Vultures and Butterflies, 61.
Ibid., 138-139.
235
Ibid., 138.
236
Sierra Becerra, “For Our Total Emancipation,” 272.
234

84

whose 12-year old daughter died in part due to malnutrition, took on the entire burden of
caring for her sick child. Marta’s husband was recently deceased, and the woman had
barely been able to scrape together the money for bus fare to the hospital, much less
medicine and substantial nourishment for the sick child.237 Marta’s story illustrates the
reality for many poor women in a country where malnutrition affected as much as 80% of
the population of children under five.238
Women also faced more frequent displacement than men. “Women outnumbered
men in the refugee camps, sometimes three or four to one.”239 It follows that the
psychological and physical trauma of displacement disproprortionately impacted women
and their children . Moreover, the guindas forced families to forego regular access to
medicine or food, which particularly impacted young children and infants.
Women suffered more when proper health measures failed, and they gained more
with even minor improvements to the system. Because of their unique relationship to
health care, women often championed progress in their local health system in ways that
both fit with the revolutionary agenda (and went against the agenda of the Salvadoran
government) and reconfigured ideals to match with their particular needs.
2. Nicaragua
Nicaraguan women faced a vastly different set of circumstances than their
Salvadoran counterparts. The FSLN strived for gender equality and aimed to establish
universal health care. Where Salvadoran women faced heightened oppression,
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Nicaraguan women saw a series of legal changes that promoted their equality in society
and in the family. “The Provision Law of 1982,” for example, “attempted to redefine
family responsibilities, making all adult family members legally liable to contribute to the
maintenance of their family.”240 The reality proved less than equitable. Even as
legislation strove for greater gender equality, women remained largely responsible for
domestic care. Further, as men were drawn into a continuous war with the Contras,
women found themselves both working outside the home and taking on full responsibility
for their households.241
Tasked with the practical, emotional, and spiritual upkeep of their families,
Nicaraguan women bore the brunt of major economic and political upheaval of the late
twentieth century. In an interview with Margaret Randall, Gloria Carrión, a Sandinista,
described the significance of women in maintaining Nicaraguan families and the impact
of crises on mothers:
Women are the pillars of their families. This is the most fundamental and
objective condition of Nicaraguan women’s lives, and perhaps of Latin American
women in general. We don’t see ourselves simply as housewives, caring for our
children, attending to the duties of the home and subordinating ourselves to our
husbands. Women are the centres of their families – emotionally, ideologically
and economically… Nicaraguan women make up a large percentage of our
agricultural workers, accounting for half of our fieldworkers. In many instances
they are the first to be affected by unemployment, inflation and shortages.242
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As the main providers for their family, women were also the first to be affected by health
crises, lack of medical resources and professionals, and shortages which induced serious
medical conditions like malnutrition.
Psychological trauma from the war had a particular impact on women and
children. According to one health journal, Nicaraguan children had “become preoccupied
with issues of war.”243 Women, in particular, faced heightened levels of anxiety and
depression in response to the loss of sons and daughters.244 As heads of households,
women were tasked with the emotional burden of caring for traumatized children and
dealing with the loss of husbands, sons, daughters, and other family members. Though all
members of Nicaraguan society were at risk for mental health problems, women’s
position in the home amplified the trauma they faced.
As health care improved, Nicaraguan women often stood to gain the most. The
success of vaccination campaigns, hydration stations for young children, and increased
access to family planning methods all improved the lives of Nicaraguan women
significantly.245 The stagnation in these programs due to warfare, then, inhibited the
liberation for women that came along with improved health care. However, women
continued to push for improved healthcare services, even as limitations constricted the
growth of state-run programs.
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The limitations placed on the state as it responded to the Contra War often came
in the form of limited health care for women and children. Health brigadistas were
community-level health workers trained to provide for basic health needs throughout the
country. This popular organizing of health workers was effective in Nicaragua, but it
underwent important changes in response to the Contra War. As the U.S.-backed
counterrevolutionaries wreaked havoc on parts of Nicaragua, the health brigadistas
changed their focus to “first aid and acute emergency care”. In response, by July 1984,
“the training of mother-child Brigadistas had lagged.”246
Women inhabited the central role in running Nicaraguan households, as solidarity
activists, and in developing and implementing effective health programs throughout
Nicaragua. This chapter argues that new conceptions of a woman’s role in society
flooded in from healthcare solidarity activists, from Sandinistas who went abroad
(particularly female Sandinistas), and from Nicaraguan women who found themselves
thrust into new leadership roles to develop community health programs.
C. Women Working in Health
Women were mobilized in health care roles as brigadistas in Nicaragua and as
sanitarias in El Salvador. The Salvadoran sanitarias were often “Young peasants, usually
girls… trained in basic health care in the guerilla hospitals, and sent back to the villages
to administer first aid and to treat some of the common illnesses, as well as run public
health education campaigns on, for example parasites or vitamins.”247 In Nicaragua, the
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state took on the responsibility of training and organizing the brigadistas. The women in
these roles participated in state-sanctioned revolution while also expanding on their role
as women in society. In El Salvador, revolutionary Salvadorans and solidarity workers
trained the young sanitaria/os so that their role as health workers was revolutionary from
the beginning. Women who served as leaders and healers continued to push against
traditional gender boundaries; they worked to define their own ideas of revolution and
worked to administer the needs they saw as necessary.
Women participated in other healthcare roles, too. They acted as nurses, doctors,
community health promoters, hospital union members, and international solidarity
workers and promoters. In Nicaragua, they worked through the state to expand healthcare
access. In both El Salvador and Nicaragua, women also worked with international
organizations, with the Catholic dioceses of their communities, with their local health
clinics, and with women’s organizations. In many cases, women stepped out of more
traditional roles and into positions of leadership in order to develop healthcare systems
that were necessary for their communities, their families, and themselves. Women
stepped into leadership positions in order to get what they needed, but in doing so, they
also defined the revolutions of both countries.
1. El Salvador
Women challenged their position both in the revolutionary zones and government
controlled areas of El Salvador. Nursing in either region gave women a position of
authority from which to pursue improved conditions as workers, as women, and as
Salvadorans. Women working as nurses in the government-controlled areas and hospitals
engaged in disobedience against the state. These subversive actions carried out under the
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nose of the brutal of the Salvadoran forces allowed women to define their own ideas of
womanhood without the support of the revolutionaries. In other words, women in El
Salvador pressed for improvements in their lives regardless of their geographic relation to
the war. Nurses on both sides held positions of power and influence that allowed them to
engage new and changing narratives of power that women expressed.
Francesca Romero discovered union work through her role as a nurse at the Social
Security Hospital in San Salvador. In 1976, she became an original member of the
Sindicato de Trabajadores del Instituto Salvadoreño del Seguro (Social the Union of
Salvadoran Social Security Institute Workers, STISSS).248 Despite the repression from
armed forces and fear that her family and fellow nurses had for her safety, she became
the only woman alongside seventeen men of the union’s coordinating committee in 1982.
Romero worked to engage more women (comprising over half of the hospital staff) in
union work, and she began planning parties and social events aimed at engaging women;
her efforts paid off, and, in 1985, she and other female hospital staff founded a women’s
committee as part of STISSS.249 The women’s committee created a newsletter and
continued engaging women through targeted efforts. The men of the STISSS questioned
the social aspect of Romero’s campaign, and they also wondered why the women’s
committee insisted on having a separate newsletter. The women, Romero said, wanted to
“express [their] thoughts, and talk about the union and about women’s problems and how
to deal with them.”250
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Romero and her fellow healthcare workers defined their own needs within the
STISSS and pushed for an expansion of union practices that matched with the needs of
the majority of the hospital’s staff. These women engaged a feminist rhetoric in
expanding their union and their hospital, and in working in solidarity with other unions in
El Salvador and Central America. Despite the considerable danger all union members
faced under the repressive Salvadoran regime, particularly during the war years, these
women considered the struggle for change paramount to the threat of violence. Romero
saw her work as honest and beneficial, and believed that if she “was going to be killed,
that’s the way it would be.”251
Women responded specifically to the gendered violence they encountered. In El
Salvador, state repression manifested in the “gendered ways in which military officials
targeted their victims.”252 Feminist solidarity between the U.S. and Central America
developed partially on the basis of reproductive rights and health. “In short, women
intervened to make the revolution relevant to their own lives and dreams.”253
In El Salvador, women organized through AMES to change their conditions and
interpret the revolution in their favor. Sierra Becerra notes that in the first three years
after AMES was formed, they “mainly organized urban-based women, demanding equal
salaries for women, employment, the lowering of food prices, and an end to forced
sterilizations.”254 However, as “early as 1981, they began organizing popular councils to
manage their immediate survival needs, such as security, food, and health.”255 The
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women’s organization responded to state violence by establishing “peasant militias and
popular health clinics and schools... The clinics treated both serious injuries from
government bombings and curable diseases such as diarrhea.”256 The association not only
wanted to carry out the goals of the revolution, it wanted to do so in a way that benefitted
women. In particular, AMES “encouraged the popular clinics to address women’s health
needs.”257 Focusing on women’s health was both in keeping with the revolutionary
agenda for free and universal health care and a manifestation of women’s particular goals
for the revolution. Women demanded a place by focusing, at least in part, on their health
needs.
Clara Méndez wrote of her time as a nurse and head of an FMLN hospital in
Chalatenango. She began supporting the revolution in 1977 in part because she saw that
“the democratic revolutionary movement had achieved great maturity in not
discriminating according to sex, color or class.”258 She established a mobile clinic in San
Salvador that put her and her family at great risk. From 1987 to 1991, she served as
“Director of an FMLN hospital in Chalatenango, overseeing the work of all the staff in
the area.”259
Salvadoran women took charge in refugee camps, as well. They addressed needs
particular to them by establishing “Committees for Women and Mothers to address issues
specific to these groups such as maternal health and child care. These committees became

256

Ibid., 272.
Ibid., 278.
258
Autobiographical Statement by Clara Méndez, 1991, Box 11, Folder 24, Organization
in Solidarity with Central America, Walter P. Reuther Library, Detroit, Michigan.
259
Ibid.

257

92

integrated into the general camp government structure.”260 Molly Todd argues that as
refugees, “women participated in community life and moved into leadership positions to
an extent far beyond what they previously had done at home in northern El Salvador.”261
Women took on a variety of roles in El Salvador as they carved out spaces for
themselves. They pursued care for their families and in so doing, they developed new
ideas of revolution, gender, health care and leadership. Though the women of Nicaragua
often had the support of the state, they, too, carved out new places for themselves in
pushing for health care that met their needs.
2. Nicaragua
Women took on the burden of implementing the new health system even as the
FSLN funneled resources toward the Contra War. The women saw need in their
communities and so worked as Sandinistas, community health planners, and solidarity
workers to ensure that the goals of the revolution would be met on their terms. As the
Sandinista revolution broke down traditional gender roles, women reimagined their
worlds; they challenged gendered boundaries even as husbands and state leaders moved
to reestablish gendered expectations. Women used health as a method for expanding their
new sense of self. They reinterpreted their reproductive labor, stepped into positions of
authority as health planners and health volunteers, and demanded improved services for
themselves and their children in spite of the ongoing war.
Nicaraguan women were deeply involved in the political discourse of their
country, whether through the intentional support of the FSLN or as wives whose
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husbands left to fight. Already the economic and emotional backbone of the country’s
households, they found their voices under the Sandinistas. Nora Astorga, who served as a
chief prosecutor of Somoza-era war criminals and later the FSLN ambassador to the
United Nations,262 explained that women’s involvement in the revolution ensured that
they would continue to actively participate in Nicaraguan politics. Astorga stated that,
“Women won’t be apathetic again”, implying a significant shift in what women accepted
as their role in society.263 Mónica Baltonado, a revolutionary and Sandinista (and one of
only three women to be awarded the title Commander Guerilla immediately following the
revolution), said that it “wasn’t until [the revolution triumphed] that [women] started to
think about [their], about [their] historically unequal condition and about the need to fight
for women’s rights.”264 Randall notes that “Revolution is the only force capable of
transforming the structure of society,” and that after the Sandinista Revolution the
Nicaraguan people were able to “break the chains of dependence and begin to participate
as ‘architects of their liberation’.”265 The revolution in Nicaragua opened up pathways for
leadership and community building that many women were unable to access previously.
Aynn Setright, an American solidarity worker, echoed Randall’s ideas of a
changing landscape for Nicaraguan women when she discussed the empowerment and
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the consequences that came along with community building in rural Nicaragua. She notes
that of the eight hundred families she worked with, “many were female-led households
because the men had been killed during the war, and even if they did have a husband or a
brother at home, those men were often drafted or recruited into the army, so these sixteen
communities were led by women”. Many of the women who led the new community
building efforts had never attended school, spoken in public or otherwise been in a
position of leadership.
As women were thrust into positions of authority, they began asking for the
reproductive health care they needed. Women who previously deferred to their husbands
now found themselves in a position to demand things for themselves, partially because
they had no choice, but also because they now felt empowered. Aynn Setright discusses
how the women she worked with in rural communities had previously lived isolated lives
where they had little choice but to birth children as they came. That changed when the
women were asked what they wanted and needed in their communities. According to
Setright, “women’s reproductive health was a big thing for them, they always came back
to that.”266 Milú Vargas, a lawyer and Sandinista, saw an explosion in feminist rhetoric
starting in 1987. At that point, women across classes became vocal in their “concerns
about motherhood, abortion, family planning, abuse, rape and labor laws… these issues
were seen differently by women in different sectors… but we needed to address them
according to who and where we were.”267 Reproductive health, decriminalizing abortions,
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and accessing family planning services were, for women of all classes, important
revolutionary issues.
D. Motherhood in Revolution
As the traditional heads of household in both El Salvador and Nicaragua, women
were tasked with the health and wellbeing of themselves and their children. Practically,
this meant that women faced not only their own poor health in times of difficulty but also
the poor health of their children. In impoverished areas that lacked basic infrastructure,
women dealt with high levels of malnutrition in their young children and struggled to
obtain appropriate medical care for them. Symbolically, women’s worth was often
defined through motherhood. At times, the state defined their worth this way, and at other
times, women addressed revolutionary goals by becoming mothers. The deep tie between
motherhood and health care (the care required for reproduction and that needed for
children) made health care an important site of organization for women and their
revolutionary goals. Motherhood was for some a burden, and for others the main focus of
revolution. But the integral link between Salvadoran women, Nicaraguan women, and
their role as mothers gave them a reason to focus their revolutionary goals on health care.
1. El Salvador
Motherhood was important to many Salvadoran women. This was evidenced in
the speeches, memoirs, and interviews women gave during and after the war years. Many
women included discussions on their children, positive and negative, and some even
claim their children as the reason behind their revolutionary choices. Women dealt with
motherhood in vastly different ways, but the significance of motherhood to Salvadoran
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women relates to how women approached healthcare needs and their own role in defining
community health care.
Clara Méndez, head of the hospital in Chalatenango in the late 1980s, peppers her
autobiographical statement with mentions of her children. She claims that her initial
decision to support the revolutionary forces was because of her position as a mother of
five.268 She proudly notes that her daughters went on to become nurses and “serve the
neediest and most exploited class.”269 Maria Eugenia, also a Salvadoran nurse, similarly
discusses her two daughters throughout the interview she gives on her time as a nurse.270
Moreover, AMES spent time promoting childcare in Managua for Salvadoran
refugees. As Sierra Becerra observes, the “‘Luz Dilian Arévalo’ childcare… center
provided for the ‘medical, nutritional, and psycho-emotional needs’ of children and
promoted social skills that departed ‘from sexist traditions’ and advanced the goals of
‘equality, mutual respect, and collective decision making’.”271 The care of children
remained central to women’s identities both practically and philosophically.
While in Nicaragua, the FSLN promoted motherhood, the FMLN discouraged it.
The “FMLN leadership maintained that deep emotional bonds limited the willingness of
their combatants, both women and men, to take risks. They therefore developed policies
that the women thought went a long way towards preventing the formation and
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consolidation of couple relationships.”272 The precarious position of the FMLN and the
rough living conditions of the combatants made pregnancy a liability. Smith-Nonini
witnessed instances of pregnancy among female sanitarias (health workers) “who
frequently spent months traveling with a platoon of mostly male combatants.” This
reality presented itself despite FMLN “policies promoting the use of birth control pills or
IUDs,” and in response, “the Frente would help [these women] either settle in a civilian
community or leave the war zone.”273 In a region that struggled to access even the most
basic health care, reproduction was dangerous not only to the cause but also the mother
and child. Motherhood, then, remained important to Salvadoran women as part of their
upbringing, but the violence of the 1980s eroded the role of it in society.
2. Nicaragua
The FSLN invoked motherhood as central to the female role in promoting
democracy, fighting poverty, and fighting off the foreign influence of the United States.
The conflict allowed women to push the boundaries even as the new government
continued to see women’s main role as reproductive. The official Sandinista position
toward women focused on motherhood that both defined women’s relevance in narrow
and problematic ways and also ensured a successful campaign for greater reproductive
and child health.
The FSLN used propaganda posters to equate being revolutionary with being a
mother. One poster published by the Asociacion de Niños Sandinistas (Association of
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Sandinista Children) exclaims “Felicidades Mama: Gracias Madre por Defender Nuestra
Alegría” (“Congratulations Mama: Thanks Mom for Defending our Joy”).274 The image
depicts a young woman, firearm slung over her back, holding a smiling baby and
corralling two blissfully happy young children in front of her. The scene links revolution,
femininity, and motherhood. That this woman was apparently able to take up arms in
favor of the Sandinista forces while pregnant and raising two young children is nothing
short of remarkable.
A more famous image taken in 1984 by Orlando Valenzuela depicts a Sandinista
fighter as she nurses her child. The woman in the image smiles broadly, indicating that
many women embraced ideas of revolutionary motherhood was promoted by the FSLN.
The image, referred to as madre armada y niño (armed mother and child) played an
important role in developing the state-sanctioned boundaries of the ‘new woman’ in
Nicaragua. Penélope Plaza Azuaje argues that images like these, along with a number of
other murals commissioned by AMNLAE, served to promote new gender roles and
definitions of womanhood.275 That AMNLAE was so heavily influenced by patriarchal
political expectations explains why many of the murals linked motherhood, revolution,
and womanhood. At the center of women’s new expected identity was motherhood and
the promotion of the nation to the next generation.
The mother in both images was not only the protector of her children, but also the
protector of her nation. The nationalist imagery was clear: women should have children
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to strengthen the nation, and they should defend the nation as they would those children.
Bertha Inés Cabrales notes in an interview for the Global Feminisms Project that women
faced a tremendous pressure to have children at a young age. As a woman heavily
involved in the Sandinista revolution, Cabrales, too, experienced the pressure, but had a
son at twenty-four, an age considered old to be having a first child.276 She indicates that
the pressure was not for her to get married and then have her child, but rather to have a
child as soon as possible. Having children, more than getting married, seemed to be a
marker for Cabrales and her peers of their success as women and as revolutionaries.
Although, as Cabrales points out, sexual relations outside of marriage were scandalous in
Nicaragua at the time, the Sandinistas ushered in the tide against that sort of
conservatism. Reproduction, not attachment to a man, defined Cabrales’ story and the
images of the two mothers used as Sandinista propaganda. New definitions of
womanhood were being etched out of old ones. Where Cabrales traditionally would have
sought out marriage first, she found herself being pressured instead to have a child; where
womanhood would not have included cargo pants and a gun, it now clearly did.
Some women felt that having children limited their ability to support the
revolution. Julia García was a poor woman living in Managua’s slums who identified
strongly with the need for reform in her country. With five children to care for, she
struggled to continue her revolutionary activities. She stated that, “It wasn’t easy being
politically active with my kids and all. I nearly abandoned them, not because I wanted to,
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but in order to fight for what we have now.”277 García, like many Nicaraguan women,
was stuck between her traditional responsibilities at home and her desire for a better
world for herself and for her children. The FSLN may have promoted motherhood, but
the reality for women was often a movement away from their roles as mothers. García is
but one example of a revolutionary woman who navigated the tricky relationship between
motherhood and revolution.
The focus on motherhood led to a focus on improving child and maternal health.
Solidarity groups and Nicaraguan activists targeted the high infant and maternal mortality
rates that existed throughout the country and particularly in rural sectors.278 As
Nicaraguan women came together and began questioning their own place in society, they
asked for more and developed new understandings of gender. Just as the Sandinistas
imprinted a particular idea of motherhood and gender upon Nicaraguan women, so, too,
did solidarity activists bring with them particular gendered ideals when they volunteered
in Nicaragua. The confluence of these new ideas and experiences allowed women to
advocate for themselves in important ways, despite attempts from leadership to reassert
gendered boundaries.
E. Gendered Solidarity in El Salvador and Nicaragua
Nicaraguan and Salvadoran activists who travelled abroad to build solidarity
networks came back with new ideas about femininity and sexuality that helped further
push at gender norms. Cabrales travelled to Sweden in the late 1970s. “In Sweden,”
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Cabrales noted, “we started to strengthen the committees in solidarity with the
Nicaraguan people.”279 After the revolution, Cabrales returned to Nicaragua where she
created programs that focused on women’s access to healthcare, including abortion, a
topic that was more widely accepted in Sweden than in Nicaragua, particularly prior to
the revolution. Cabrales brought back with her important ideas about family planning and
access to reproductive health care, but also how women should be “muy libres” in their
sexual experiences.280 That women should have a choice over their sexuality, including
access to abortion and family planning, broke with the traditional ideas of femininity and
motherhood in Nicaragua. Family planning had become more accessible and acceptable
under the Sandinistas, but sexual pleasure and abortion remained taboo. Setright notes
that in her time working in rural communities, she never discussed abortion, mainly
because it was illegal, but also because “it wasn’t part of the discourse.”281 Nonetheless,
Nicaraguan women, like Cabrales, continued to push the boundaries of Nicaraguan
culture and of Sandinista politics to ensure that these new ideas of liberation permeated
the new healthcare system being built.
While activists who left their country returned new ideas about gender roles,
solidarity organizations from around the globe funneled their own ideas about women’s
health into Central America. Sierra Becerra argues that, in El Salvador, “Part of AMES’
support in the United States came from reproductive rights organizers. The Reproductive
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Rights National Network advocated a broad vision of reproductive justice, defending
access to abortion and contraception, while simultaneously denouncing forced
sterilizations and cutbacks of social services that pushed pregnant mothers into
poverty.”282 Other U.S.-based organizations supported revolutionary goals of promoting
women in leadership. The FMLN Women’s Paramedic Training Project, funded by the
Bravo Fund through CISPES, educated poor women in basic literacy and medicine. The
project, started in 1990, came at the end of the conflict in El Salvador, but in just one year
provided fifty women with their “first opportunity to learn to read and write,” and placed
them in the field as “core medical personnel” where they helped “organize the medical
system.” The program took both a local and gendered approach, promoting a
“community-wide approach to health” and placing “special emphasis on women’s, infant
and family health.”283
From 1988 to 1990, Lois Wessel worked in Nicaragua’s Department of Maternal
and Child Health through an organization called Ipas, based in Chapel Hill, North
Carolina. The official reason for her work was the reduction of maternal mortality in the
country, but they also, less openly, promoted access to safe abortion. She described the
organization by saying: “It’s really an abortion rights organization that looked at things to
reduce maternal mortality from self-induced abortion both from post-partum hemorrhage,
and it does this looking both at policy and access to abortion services.”284 Abortion was
illegal in Nicaragua, however, and so Ipas promoted education of procedures that were
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used for gynecological purposes as well as abortion. In describing this work, Wessel
stated:
Ipas promoted the use of a vacuum aspiration syringe that could be used for many
different gynecological procedures and it didn’t take any electricity and it was
able to be cold sterilized… It was promoted for when there are pieces of the
placenta that don’t come out when the baby’s born or when someone’s got some
kind of dysfunctional uterine bleeding, but everyone knew you could also use it to
terminate early on. So we taught this technology, and on the official line was that
we were using it for all these other medical problems, but anyone who learned
could also use it for abortions. But at the same time, the very active women’s
movement was also working on this in their own abortion clinics that existed and
probably still exist today that were not part of the Ministry of Health.285
Abortion was a particularly important issue for many women, as they saw the right to
choose a pregnancy as lining up with revolutionary ideology. Ideas about abortion, and
the means that funded abortion capabilities, often came through internationalist solidarity
workers.
In her time at the Ministry of Health, Wessel also worked on improving record
keeping and statistical understandings of maternal health. For example, it was common
practice at the Ministry to “write that a woman died of hemorrhage or infection,” but not
to indicate whether it was “from a self-induced abortion,… a back-alley abortion,… a
poorly managed pregnancy, [or] hemorrhage after delivery.” Encouraging better record
keeping was an important step in saving women’s lives and improving the Ministry’s
capacity to serve the most vulnerable populations of Nicaragua.286
International solidarity played an important role in influencing Nicaraguan
women and the reproductive medicine they were able to access. Beliefs about sexuality
and reproduction shifted as Nicaraguan and Salvadoran women interacted with feminist
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ideologies from all over the world. Women adopted ideas about abortion and sexual
liberation that they felt matched with their own interpretations of the revolution. They
actively engaged with opportunities for leadership in health care that were funded by
international sources. Solidarity in both directions, then, proved vital to the development
of feminist health practices in both El Salvador and Nicaragua.
F. Conservative Backlash
In both Nicaragua and El Salvador, women faced opposition to their revolutionary
goals. In Nicaragua, as men returned home from the revolution and the FSLN took the
reins, leaders and husbands attempted to reintroduce traditional expectations of gender
roles. In El Salvador, women faced backlash from a patriarchal government as well as
their husbands when they tried to step into positions of leadership. Often, this
conservative backlash came in response to women’s roles as healthcare workers and in
reaction to more accessible family planning services.
Aynn Setright claimed that in Nicaragua, men “were very suspicious of the
women not just accepting the children that god gave them, but doing any kind of family
planning”. The conservative backlash came with a “shocking amounts of domestic
violence”. She notes that women’s new leadership roles “created a lot of tension as the
men came back” from fighting.287 Women addressed the domestic violence publicly.
Setright saw a number of attempts to combat the violence including the beating of pots
and pans outside of a home where a man could be heard abusing his wife.288 Rosario
Montoya tells of Doña Julia who hung her torn underwear for all the neighborhood to see
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in order to embarrass her husband. Montoya points out that such an act “would have been
inconceivable before the revolution.”289
Gloria Carrión, a Sandinista, discussed the tension as well. Carrión stated that:
Women’s political involvement had its effect on relationships between women
and men. Women began to develop their own points of view on issues and began
to express their ideas. In homes where both the husband and wife lived together
new relationships developed. Women started to make their feelings and opinions
known. They would disagree with their husbands on issues where they never had
before. And as women got involved in activities outside the home their time was
less fully devoted to the home and the division of labour within the family began
to change. All this demanded a re-evaluation of the family situation. And our
women’s movement became stronger through this whole process.290
Women faced tension with husbands and increased rates of domestic violence. They
actively responded to these new challenges by mobilizing community networks. In El
Salvador, “Women’s organizing set limits to sexism.”291 As AMES worked to address
marital rape, the organization also tried not to alienate the “many peasant women who
had lost their partners, sons, and male relatives to state violence.”292
Navigating changing gender norms proved difficult in both countries, but women
rallied together to address the backlash that resulted. Women would not go back to the
lives they led before, particularly those women who had stepped into healthcare
leadership roles. Setright noted that the women who had come to live in community
following displacement chose to involve themselves in building their communities, in
part through creating healthcare systems beneficial to all of the women. When their
husbands returned from the war, the women wanted to stay and enjoy the benefits of the
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networks they had built, but the men wanted to move back to their isolated homes.293
Women’s desire to stay in community fundamentally changed their way of life, as well as
their children’s lives. The decisions that women made, despite the backlash and tension
with their husbands and male leadership, contributed to important shifts in gender roles.
Women who stood up to their husbands in both Nicaragua and El Salvador contributed to
these feminist revolutions that had profound impacts in both societies.
G. Conclusion
Health care played an important role for women in the revolutions of both
Nicaragua and El Salvador. In both countries, women pursued the revolutionary goals of
increased access to health care, particularly reproductive and child health, even as the
revolutions were forced away from those goals to attend to warfare. As the need for
healthcare workers increased, women stepped up. They used the platforms they gained as
volunteers, community health workers, and nurses to navigate the revolution in ways that
benefitted them. Women did not subjugate their own demands to support the broader
revolution, but rather they built a feminist understanding that can be understood through
their roles in health care.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION: AFTER THE REVOLUTIONS
“everything went on the same only different after the revolution: the same only
different.”294 – Sara Miles
On January 16, 1992, the Salvadoran government and FMLN signed the
Chapultepec peace accord, ostensibly ending over a decade of violent warfare in the
country. Less than two years prior, Violeta Chamorro de Barrios defeated the FSLN in
Nicaragua’s presidential elections, bringing a decade of Sandinista rule to a close. Under
these new terms, and with a pivot toward the Middle East, U.S. intervention in the region
slowed dramatically, and the armed violence that characterized the 1980s dissipated.
International solidarity workers left the region en masse (though many remained
in close contact with people and organizations). Those who stayed experienced major
changes in the relevance of their previous roles. Jill Winegardner lived in Nicaragua
during the transition years. As an educator, she felt the election of Chamorro through her
students. “One of the things that happened was the students in my [neuropsychological]
course started having economic problems, so they weren’t able to participate in the
training. Some of them had to take other jobs or move to other countries.”295 Aynn
Setright watched a major change in access take place. The Chamorro government worked
to privatize pharmaceuticals, so while Nicaraguans continued to have access to doctors,
as per the constitution, they often lacked the funds to buy the medicines prescribed to
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them. “You could go see a doctor, but the doctor no longer had a pharmacy to give away
the medicine.” This, according to Setright, led to “a huge deterioration of the health
services provided.”296
As international solidarity shrank, leftist activists continued to fund health
initiatives in Nicaragua, just not through the government. “Aid that had formerly been
provided to [MINSA] was rapidly shifted for distribution to nongovernmental
organizations in what must be the first international campaign to privatize leftist
assistance for public health.” A call to refuse funding from USAID was published in a
1990 edition of Links, a magazine produced by NCAHRN.297 Some rightist political and
religious groups stepped in, “including the Dooley Foundation, Freedom Medicine, and
the Pan American Development Foundation.”298
Government aid shifted inversely to solidarity aid. Whereas the United States
backed the Contras and economically undermined the Sandinistas through sanctions, less
than one month after Chamorro was elected, President Bush lifted sanctions and
requested $300 million in aid for Nicaragua.299 The irony, Garfield and Williams point
out, came when USAID encouragement of “community participation and public healthoriented health professionals” matched with former Sandinista policies. Moreover, the
health workers most qualified to carry out USAID work “were FSLN-related groups and
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individuals.” USAID found itself in a position “to encourage primary care without
supporting the Sandinistas.”300
In the immediate aftermath, Nicaragua struggled to maintain “a health system”
that “limped along bravely.”301 The movement away from socialized health care
unraveled many of the achievements gained by the FSLN. Cheasty Anderson attributes
the deterioration to “a loss of popular participation and public involvement in the health
sector,” and “a failure at the Ministry level to adequately budget and provision the health
care system.”302 Garfield and Williams, too attribute the lagging health system to loss of
popular support, arguing that “by 1991 organization and motivation were in short
supply,” and claiming that the anticipated number of health brigadista volunteers fell far
short of the necessary target.303
Throughout the 1990s, the Chamorro government pursued a policy of healthcare
decentralization defined by four major qualities: “overall health spending reductions,
spending priorities for secondary care over primary care, privatization, and the promotion
of user fees.”304 The results of decentralization and decreased social spending included a
twelve percent drop between 1992 and 1996 in real health spending,305 as much as a fifty
percent drop in prenatal coverage and vaccination rates in certain provinces,306 and a
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tripling in incidence of malaria on average between 1995-1997 when compared to the
1980-1990 average.307
Decentralization was encouraged by international institutions like the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, as part of a neoliberal agenda, and
led to a decline in the health system and an undermining of medical workers. For nearly
four months in 1998, some 4,000 Nicaraguan doctors went on strike to protest their
poverty wages.308 The debt accrued by Nicaragua in the 1990s further devastated the
revolutionary spirit that came to define the decade prior.
In El Salvador, the FMLN became a political party, and the government moved
back in to war zones previously evacuated of all government services. These FMLNcontrolled zones, where popular medicine had developed with the help of solidarity
activists, revolutionary actors, and volunteer community health workers, came back
under the infrastructure and health sphere of the central government. Mark Smith recalled
the plight of those who had devoted their lives to providing medical care for their
communities. “After the war, as the ministry came back in… the promoter’s organized
and tried to become employees of the ministry so they would be paid for what they were
doing because up until this point, they had received no compensation, this was all
volunteer work.” Many wanted to remain village health workers under the ministry, but
“it didn’t work out.” Smith recalled “maybe two or three who became ministry
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employees.” He went on to say that “the Ministry wanted to put their own people in.” The
community health workers were “seen as kind of a threat by the Ministry.”309
Susan Classen recalled the uncertainty surrounding the return of the Ministry of
Health to Chalatenango department. “It was a real question for a lot of people. Is it the
best in the long run to work with the Health Department or is it best to keep the
alternative health care system?” Classen went on to note that different regions of the
department agreed to cooperate to varying degrees.310 The popular health system, which
had functioned for years underfunded, understaffed, and understocked, continued on
throughout the country even after the cease fire.
Over a five-year period, between 1992 and 1997, Sandy Smith-Nonini witnessed
the power struggle between health workers reluctant to cede control to the government
and the “ministry’s gradual reentry and assertion of control over the ex-war zone’s health
services.”311 The rural areas of Chalatenango, many of which had been left empty during
the war, were repopulated starting in the late 1980s. Smith-Nonini notes that in her five
years there, the “situation of the rural population in government-controlled areas was
little changed… compared with before the war.”312 The post-peace accord struggle over
health “reflected a dialectic between the ministry’s commitment to a centralized
biomedical model dominated by physicians and the popular system’s commitment to a
strong degree of community control over health and reliance on local lay health
promoters.”313
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As in Nicaragua, structural readjustment imposed by the World Bank in 1995
encouraged restructuring of the El Salvador’s healthcare system.314 Ironically, while
USAID funded as much as 75% of the Salvadoran Ministry of Health’s pharmaceutical
purchases in the 1980s in an attempt to bolster the central government, by the early
1990s, funding was being funneled toward local health promoters.315 Physicians at the
Ministry resented this fact. By the time USAID funding was phased out in 1994, the
health promoter program had been thoroughly undermined by physicians who saw it as
dangerous and threatening.316
Political and economic changes in the 1990s severely undermined the
revolutionary momentum of the 1980s. The healthcare policies, the impact of solidarity,
and the fracturing of gender norms that occurred remain important legacies of a
revolutionary period in Central American history. Understanding the revolutionary nature
of popular health care in 1980s Central America helps illuminate how revolutionary
medicine still can be. Taking up the call for popular medicine of FMLN and FSLN
revolutionaries remains as vital today as it was then. The privatization of medical care
and pharmaceuticals across the world threaten the lives of billions of people. The
revolutionary spirit of Central America in the 1980s has much to teach us about how we
can combat flawed and dangerous healthcare practices across the globe.
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APPENDIX A. POPULAR HEALTH WORK DAY PROGRAM
Program for a Popular Health Work Day held in Managua, Nicaragua on October 21 and
22, 1988. In author’s possession, provided by Dr. Arnold Matlin.
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APPENDIX B. NCAHRN PAMPHLET
NCAHRN pamphlet. This pamphlet exemplifies the campaign efforts undertaken by
solidarity activists in the 1980s. It includes information on the activities of NCAHRN,
including the North America-Nicaragua Annual Health Colloquium and Insulin for Life.
In author’s possession, provided by Dr. Arnold Matlin.
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